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Pathway to minority shareholder protection: 
derivative actions in the People's Republic of China 
DONALD C. CLARKE AND NICHOLAS C. HOWSON* 
I Introduction 
In October 2005 China's national legislature passed a series of major 
amendments to the original Company Law of 1994, permitting, among 
other things, the first form of derivative lawsuit in modern Chinese 
history. 1 Effective from 2006, this innovation was designed to improve 
China's corporate governance system and provide a weapon against 
insider and controlling shareholder abuse in China's newly corporatized 
listed companies. The new mechanism was also consistent with a 
broader formal shift in the Company Law towards a greater emphasis 
on judicial power and ex post remedies, instead of ex ante supervision by 
administrative agencies. However, the derivative lawsuit was introduced 
into a political-economic order, and an accompanying legal system, that 
is barely three decades old with the nation's first Western-style corporate 
law not effective until 1995. Moreover, few of those who draft, admin­
ister, or adjudicate on the basis of corporate legislation have any appre­
ciable business experience, the state at multiple levels remains a 
commanding presence as a regulator and a corporate shareholder, and 
genuinely private large companies are rare. 
In this chapter, we look at the past and present of shareholder deriv­
ative actions in the PRC. Using a set of over fifty cases, we trace the 
gradual introduction of the derivative lawsuit into China's legal system 
• The authors wish to thank Tsinghua University Law School doctoral student Ms Liu 
Yingjiao for her research assistance, and Ms Liu's doctoral adviser, Professor Zhu Ciyun, 
also of the Tsinghua Law School, for her support and assistance. 
1 We hereafter refer to the original Company Law, passed in 1993 and effective in 1994, as 
the 1994 Company Law and to the revised version, passed in 2005 and effective on 1 
January 2006, as the 2006 Company Law. 
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and its development after 1 January 2006. We find the design of the 2006 
Company Law derivative lawsuit to be, in some respects, innovative and 
appropriate for Chinese circumstances: for instance, it includes parties 
other than standard insiders and fiduciaries as defendants, and thus per­
mits 'horizontal' claims against controlling or oppressive shareholders. At 
the same time, we find certain design flaws, including standing-based 
obstacles placed in the way of plaintiffs, a lack of clarity regarding demand, 
demand excusal, and refusal, and an unnecessary distinction regarding the 
required wrong underlying derivative actions directed at corporate fiducia­
ries and 'others'. We also find robust use of the derivative lawsuit by 
plaintiffs and courts both before and after its formal recognition in law. 
This use seems to be almost entirely limited to the closely held form of 
corporation under PRC law, the limited liability company (youxian zeren 
gongsi) (LLC), with derivative lawsuits involving the widely held company 
limited by shares (gufen youxian gongsi) (CLS) virtually absent. This 
absence is particularly striking because the derivative lawsuit was included 
in the 2006 Company Law precisely in order to give minority shareholders 
in such CLSs a way to hold insiders and controlling shareholders account­
able at law for rampant malfeasance. 
II Economic and legal reform in the PRC and the derivative 
action 
1 Introduction: the derivative lawsuit and corporate governance 
in the Chinese context 
China's corporate governance experts and legislative drafters have long 
viewed the derivative lawsuit as a necessary part of that nation's effective 
corporate governance system. The actual implementation of a derivative 
lawsuit mechanism in China has implications going beyond mere cor­
porate governance concerns, however. As we describe in more detail 
below, many corporate entities in the PRC are dominated by insiders 
who have - or represent - significant political power that exceeds their 
formal economic or management power. Leading directors and officers 
at large corporatized state-controlled enterprises are often Communist 
Party of China nomenklatura appointments or representatives of central 
government institutions. The same is true of insiders at enterprises 
controlled by local governments or subordinate Party levels. Moreover, 
even if insiders are not directly tied to the Party or state, they are often 
part of a system (xi tong) of connected actors with overwhelming political 
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and economic power. Thus, any legal mechanism that empowers minor­
ity shareholders to attack the misdeeds of such insiders also empowers 
weak political-economic actors to constrain or penalize vastly superior 
forces in Chinese society. 2 
2 Corporatization and its effects 
The development of derivative suits in China cannot be understood in 
isolation from the political and economic history of the PRC over the 
past several decades. 
The early stages of post-Mao economic reform saw efforts by policy 
makers to reform traditional state-owned enterprises - enterprises that 
were plagued by low productivity, unresponsiveness to economic signals, 
and waste. The traditional SOE was not simply a corporation wholly 
owned by a single shareholder, the state. Instead, it is more aptly seen as a 
division or aggregation of productive assets within the loosely organized 
firm of China, Inc. It had managers who could move up a bureaucratic 
hierarchy into progressively more politically powerful positions. The 
traditional SOE did not issue any ownership interests in itself, much 
less something like stock or transferable equity interests. Moreover, the 
'control' interest in SOEs (e.g., the right to appoint management and 
appropriate profits) was not necessarily in the hands of the same admin­
istrative body representing the central state - or not necessarily at the 
central level. SOEs could be effectively controlled by subordinate units of 
government at or above the county level even if they were formally 
subject to the control of a central line ministry. 
The policy of corporatization essentially sought to abolish the tradi­
tional SOE as an organizational form by converting SOEs into some 
form of company authorized under and governed by the PRC Company 
Law: ( 1 )  a CLS, the approximate equivalent of a Delaware corporation or 
the German Aktiengesellschaft; (2) an LLC, intended for a much smaller 
and more closely knit group of investors; or (3) a wholly state-owned 
LLC, a special type of LLC that is wholly owned by a state agency and has 
no shareholders' meeting (effectively, an SOE given 'enterprise legal 
2 An excellent example of the forces at play is Shen Guantong, Yang Yongxin, Ni A mao and Lu 
Zhuqin representing 165 other shareholders v. Shaoxing County Materials General Company 
Assets Liquidation Small Group re: Zhejiang Golden Bridge Co., Ltd and Shaoxing County 
People's Government, Zhejiang Province Shaoxing Municipal Intermediate People's Court 
(2003), shao zhong min er chu zi no. 253 (available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/ 
displaycontent.asp?gid=ll7490027) [Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003]. 
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person' status as a subspecies of LLC). In most cases, this process did not 
involve privatization or withdrawal of the Party/state from the economy, 
because a controlling share of the stock in the converted enterprise 
went to non-private entities. Even after two decades, the Party/state, at 
the central and local levels, remains firmly committed to retaining 
control over enterprises in many sectors. This is true for both the usual 
suspects for state control -national-security-related industries, natural 
monopolies, sectors providing important public goods and services, and 
important enterprises in pillar industries and the increasingly supported 
high-technology sector - and other enterprises that are profitable for 
insiders or local-level control parties, and can be promoted with 
public investment. In particular, this strategy of corporatization without 
privatization coupled with the maintenance of central and local state 
control has determined the ownership, control and governance struc­
tures in China's listed companies, whether listed on China's domestic 
exchanges, in Hong Kong or internationally. Control by a single state 
shareholder is quite common in Chinese listed companies. A study of 
corporate governance conducted in 2002 by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission and the State Economic and Trade 
Commission found that, of 1 ,051 controlling shareholders in the 1 , 1 75 
listed companies studied, 77 per cent could be considered 'of a state 
nature' (guojia xingzhi) while in 390 companies a single state share­
holder held over a half of the shares. 3 
This pattern of ownership and control has important implications for 
China's corporate law and corporate governance regime in general and 
the derivative lawsuit in particular. First, the state's policy of maintaining 
a full or controlling interest in enterprises in various sectors leads to a 
fundamental dilemma in Chinese corporate governance. The state wants 
the enterprises it controls absolutely and owns partially to be run effi­
ciently, but not solely for the purpose of shareholder wealth maximiza­
tion. A necessary element of the state control of an enterprise is the use of 
that control for purposes other than the maximization of its wealth as a 
shareholder -purposes such as the maintenance of urban employment 
levels, direct control over sensitive industries, effective price control in a 
given sector, politically motivated job placement, or the extraction of 
3 The study is reported by P. Qi, ' Guojia jing mao wei fuzhuren Jiang Qiangui: zuo shangshi 
gongsi chengxin fuze de konggu gudong ['SETC vice chairman Jiang Qiangui: be a sincere 
and responsible listed company controlling shareholder'] (2003), fingji Ribao [Economic 
Daily], 29 January. 
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profits for politically privileged insiders. In using its control for these 
purposes, however, the state openly - and not necessarily fraudulently 
(for that see below) - exploits minority shareholders, who have no other 
way to benefit from their investment. As long as state policy requires the 
state to remain an active controlling investor in firms of which it is not 
the sole shareholder, meaningful legal protection for minority share­
holders will mean either constraints on the state's ability to do precisely 
those things for which it has retained control, or else a de facto separate 
legal regime (at least as far as minority shareholder rights are concerned) 
for enterprises in which the state is the dominant shareholder. A separate 
legal regime would require the maintenance of a strict boundary between 
state-controlled companies, on the one hand, and other companies, on 
the other, however - a boundary that it was precisely the ambition of the 
corporatization policy and the promulgation of the Company Law to 
erase. The failure to face this question squarely has made it extremely 
difficult to formulate legal rules on the duties of insiders and controlling 
shareholders in these newly created, and absolutely dominated, firms. 
Second, the prevalence of concentrated ownership in Chinese firms 
means that the main agency problem in Chinese corporate governance is 
not vertical, between disaggregated shareholders and managers, but hori­
zontal, between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders. In this 
respect, China is like most of the world. What is exceptional, however, is the 
identity of the controlling shareholder. In most cases, it either is or is closely 
connected to a governmental entity or Party organization. This means that 
there is a higher likelihood that a shareholder lawsuit or a derivative suit 
involving a corporatized entity, especially a politically privileged one that 
has been allowed to access the public capital markets, will, in substance, be 
directed at a Party group, the state, a state-affiliated agency, or the agent of 
any of these. The claim will therefore be politically sensitive - something 
that is likely to affect the willingness and ability of judicial institutions to 
accept the lawsuit and hear the underlying claim. 
The political sensitivity of such lawsuits is even clearer when we note 
that an important legacy of this reform process is that the administrative 
channels of control present in the traditional SOE have not disappeared 
but often continue to function in the shadows, supplanting the formal 
channels envisaged in the Company Law.4 For instance, the board of 
4 See N. Howson, 'China's restructured commercial banks: the old nomenklatura system 
serving new corporate governance structures?', in M. Avery et al. ( eds.), China's Emerging 
Financial Markets: Challenges and Global Impact (2009), Singapore: John Wiley & Sons 
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directors may be bypassed entirely in matters such as the appointment of 
the chief executive officer or other important operational decisions. 
Instead, the government agency that controlled the firm before its 
restructuring (or the Party structure behind that state institution) will 
continue to issue instructions in much the same way after restructuring. 
Thus, in considering the viability of derivative actions in the PRC, 
analysts and the corporate law itself must always take account of the 
pervasive state presence inside large corporations in many sectors - in 
particular, in publicly listed companies- and be alert to the presence of 
critically important norms, practices, and lines of authority that simply 
do not show up in any state laws or regulations, and are typically not 
mentioned at all in corporate disclosure documents. 5 
Third, the reform -era corporate capital structures outlined above are 
an invitation to opportunism, abuse and outright fraud by controlling 
shareholders and insiders - an invitation that has been taken up with 
gusto at CLSs (publicly listed or not) and closely held firms alike. As our 
case reports show, closely held firms are a fertile setting for fraud, looting 
and asset stripping, minority shareholder oppression, and mismanage­
ment. Further, problems in public companies - despite mandatory PRC 
and foreign disclosure requirements, the power of PRC and foreign 
securities and stock exchange regulators, and the threat of foreign secur­
ities class action suits - are even worse. Public companies have been run 
as vehicles to attract passive investment capital from the stock markets 
and serve the needs of the controlling shareholder (and its insiders).6 
'Tunnelling' by individual insiders and controlling shareholders, both 
(Asia): 123-63; and R. McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist 
Rulers (201 0), New York: HarperCollins, chap. 5. 
5 For example, the A-share (Shanghai) and H-share (Hong Kong) prospectuses for the 
Agricultural Bank of China's 2010 initial public offering are almost completely silent on 
the role of the Communist Party in the bank. The Party's presence is indicated only 
obliquely, in the biography of one officer who is also the secretary of the bank's (Party's) 
discipline inspection committee. Apart from the biographies of key personnel, the word 
'Party' (dang) does not appear at all. As one of us has noted elsewhere, the same was true 
for the earlier Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China offerings. 
Howson ('China's restructured commercial banks'), 140-1 .  
6 S .  Green, China's Stockmarket: A Guide to Its Progress, Players, and Prospects (2003), 
London: Profile Books, ll8-53; K. Cao, 'Guanyu zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongsifa 
('xiugai caoan') de shuoming' ['Explanation regarding 'Company Law of the PRC 
(amended draft)'] , in M. Gui (ed.), Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengquanfa, zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo gongsifa xin jiu tiaowen duizhao jianming jiedu [Straightforward 
Reading and New-Old Comparison of the Securities Law and Company Law of the 
People's Republic of China] (2005), Beijing: Zhongguo minzhu fazhi chubanshe [China 
Democracy and Legal System Press]:  525-45, 528-30. 
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state and non-state, by means of related-party transactions is notorious; 
in 2002 tunnelling by controlling shareholders was estimated at 96.7 
billion yuan, equivalent to the total amount of money raised in stock 
markets in the same year,7 and by the following year it had doubled.8 It is 
easy to understand, therefore, why policy makers in the early 2000s 
sought to address this and other governance problems by amending 
the 1 994 Company Law wholesale so as to enhance the judicial remedies 
available to minority shareholders against insiders, and controlling 
shareholders.9 The 2006 Company Law accomplishes this goal in formal 
terms, with the derivative action in article 152 a key element in making 
the new substantive causes of action on corporate fiduciary duties, 
shareholder oppression, and related-party transactions truly justiciable, 
or at least immune to the blocking power held by controlling share­
holders and their designated directors and officers. In 2008 Jin Jianfeng, 
chief judge of the Supreme People's Court no. 2 Civil Division (the 
department of the court occupied with corporate law litigation), high­
lighted this critical aspect of the derivative lawsuit mechanism when he 
wrote, 'If we don't establish a shareholders' derivative lawsuit system, the 
articles of the Company Law will be useless and empty provisions. ' 10 
3 The LLC form and other non-Company-Law forms 
The LLC and its informal close company analogues are at the centre of 
almost all our derivative lawsuit cases. That is true for two reasons: 
because the courts do not accept cases related to widely held CLSs, and 
because a significant amount of business undertaken in contemporary 
7 S. Li, 'Da gudong qianyi zhankuan qiaoxiang jingzhong, tunshi ju'e lirun ling ren you' ['Big 
shareholders misappropriate 100 billion, sounding the tocsin; gobble up huge profits, 
making people concerned'] {2004), Shanghai Zhengquan Baa [Shanghai Securities News], 
2 April (available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/t/20040402/0615698518.shtml). 
8 See Y. Zhang, 'Da gudong zhanyong shangshi gongsi zijin xu biaoben jianzhi' ['Both the 
root cause and symptoms of misappropriation of listed company assets by big share­
holders must be cured') {2004), Zhengquan shibao [Securities Times], 7 December 
(available at http:/ /business.sohu.com/20041207 /n2233 71872.shtml). 
9 This is stated explicitly in the influential Corporate Governance Report issued by the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2003; see Shanghai Stock Exchange Research Center (ed.), 
Zhonguo gongsi zhili baogao (2003 nian) [China Corporate Governance Report (2003)] 
{2003), Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe [Fudan University Press), 20-32. 
10 J. Jin, 'Gudong paisheng susong zhidu yanjiu' ['A study of the shareholders' derivative 
lawsuit system'], in B. Wang et al. (eds.), Shijianzhong de gongsifa [ Company Law in 
Practice] (2008), Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe [Social Sciences Academic 
Press), 412-28, 4 14. 
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China is not related to the CLS form (whether or not sourced in tradi­
tional SOEs). 1 1  
In fact, a large amount o f  investment and commercial activity is 
effected through arrangements that are neither corporate ( CLS or LLC) 
nor have anything much to do with the PRC Company Law, of whatever 
vintage. Many investment or capital aggregation transactions in China 
are based in contractual arrangements such as 'agreements' (xieyi), 'joint 
operations' (lianying), 'cooperative' (hezuo) or non-legal person 'part­
nership' (hehuo) arrangements. 12 Even when something resembling a 
business organization is established, and even if formal 'enterprise legal 
person' status is conferred on the entity by registration with the appro­
priate bureau of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, 
the resulting firm very often has no legal basis in the PRC Company Law 
or the various foreign-invested enterprise statutes and their implement­
ing regulations. 13 
This persistent instability in corporate legal identity and corporate law 
application leads to difficulties in applying a derivative action meant for 
the corporate form. For example, the Chongqing Coal Mine 2006 case14 
1 1  In 2006, for example, there were 7,210 industrial CLSs in China. Their gross value ofindustrial 
output was 10.6 per cent of the national total. By contrast, there were 45,738 non-state-owned 
LLCs; their GVIO was 17.4 per cent of the national total. See National Bureau of Statistics, 
Zhongguo gongye jingji tongji nianjian 2007 [Statistical Yearbook of China's I ndustrialEconomy 
2007] (2007), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe [China Statistics Press] ,  54. 
12 See, for example, the structures featured in Zhang funran v. Zhang Jianwei and Xie X. re: 
Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate Consulting Company Limited, Shanghai Jiading District Basic­
Level People's Court (2007), jia min er (shang) chu zi no. 944; on appeal Shanghai no. 2 
Intermediate People's Court (2008), er zhang min san (shang) zi no. 93) (available at http:// 
vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/ displaycontent.asp?Gid= 1 17612885) [Shanghai Taiwu Real 
Estate 2008]; and Beijing Longsheng Real Estate Development Company Limited v. China 
National Minorities Periodicals re: Beijing Gelairui National Minorities Culture Media 
Center Company Limited, Beijing no. 1 Intermediate People's Court (2008), yi zhang min 
chu zi no. 9701; on appeal Beijing Higher People's Court (2009), gao min zhang zi no. 2325 
(available at http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp?Gid=117615003) [Beijing 
Glory Project 2009]. 
13 See, for example, the entity at issue in Su Zhen and Han Fang v. Rang Chunming re: Beijing 
Tonghua !inqiu Shangwang Company Limited, Beijing Municipal Haidian District Basic­
Level People's Court (2009), hai min chu zi no. 32426 (available at http://vip.chinalawinfo. 
com/Case/displaycontent.asp?Gid=l 17654480) [Beijing Tonghua Online 2009]; this was 
established as an 'equity cooperative' (gufen hezuo) collectively owned enterprise in 1993, 
and then transformed into an LLC with deemed investment from the former collective's 
workers. 
14 X. Power Enterprise General Company and Y. Enterprise Company Limited v. Deng, 
Cooperative Mine, He and Z. Mining Company Limited, Chongqing no. 2 Intermediate 
People's Court (2005), yu er zhang fa min zhu zi no. 28; on appeal Chongqing Higher 
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features an LLC established around a coal mine asset. The investor in the 
coal mine LLC is listed as a government bureau (ju), but another LLC 
(acting for the bureau) attempts to initiate a derivative action on behalf 
of the coal mine LLC against a factory (chang) possibly without inde­
pendent legal personality. These transitional identities provide ample 
defences for the defendants, which are effective in the first-instance 
hearing but are rejected on appeal. 
Another case, Beijing Golden Century 2009,15 seems a relatively 
straightforward corporate derivative action. Two LLC shareholders sue 
the company's legal representative, director, and general manager (the 
same person) to wrest back control of the company after a unanimous 
shareholders' resolution ousting him from any role in it. 
Straightforward, that is, until the opinion recites that the LLC exists 
only in the most formal sense, that the plaintiff shareholders never 
contributed capital to the enterprise, and that the equity interests in 
the LLC have already been distributed to forty-three peasants (in 
exchange for contributions of land use rights) acting through a 'rural 
cooperative'. The defendant's key defence is that the plaintiffs are not 
true shareholders of the LLC whose interests they purport to be protect­
ing, and thus their 'shareholders' resolution' ousting the defendant is 
void. Both the basic-level court and the intermediate court on appeal are 
forced to rely on pure formalities (the registration of shareholder status 
and attendant promises to contribute capital) to permit the derivative 
claim. Likewise, the Beijing Tonghua Online 2009 opinion allows a 
derivative action on behalf of an LLC transformed from a collectively 
owned enterprise, but the court has to use both the 'Township collec­
tively owned enterprise provisions' and the 2006 Company Law to reject 
the underlying claim of breach of duty of loyalty by an LLC fiduciary, 
because an 'all-workers' meeting at the collective (doing double duty as 
an investors' meeting for the LLC) constituted prior approval of the 
allegedly breaching action. 
People's Court (2006) [judgment identifier not provided] (available at http:/ /vip.china­
lawinfo.com/ case/ displaycontent.asp ?Gid= 1 17561941) [ Chongqing Coal Mine 2006] . 
15 Beijing Municipal Houlu Agricultural Labor Commercial Company and Beijing 
Municipal Shunyi Houlu Cement Components v. Xu Liansheng re: Beijing Golden 
Century Agricultural Development Company Limited, Beijing Municipal Shunyi 
District Basic-Level People's Court (2009), shun min chu zi no. 75; on appeal Beijing 
no. 2 Intermediate People's Court (2009), er zhong min zhong zi no. 08234 (available at 
http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp?Gid= 1 1761 8214) [Beijing Golden 
Century 2009] . 
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These forms - whether LLCs or informal analogues that have continued 
or grown organically - are far more like partnerships (with corporate 
personality) than corporations with a strict separation between ownership 
and management. The norms governing corporations differ significantly 
from those governing partnerships, and touch on every major area of 
enterprise law. Most important, in this chapter, is the lack of any separation 
of ownership and management in the partnership-like LLC entities. This 
lack of separation throws into doubt the suitability of corporate derivative 
actions for entities such as LLCs and contracted partnerships, in which 
there is no separation between ownership and management, and manage­
ment cannot therefore absolutely block a lawsuit against itself brought by 
other investors, whether in their own name or in that of the entity. In 
partnership-like entities, any partner can act as an agent for the partnership. 
Not only that, but the vector of duties is different: in corporations, fiducia­
ries owe duties to the corporation, and in very special situations to the 
shareholders; in partnerships, however, partners owe duties not only to the 
partnership but also to the other partners. In many of the cases we now see 
in the PRC, therefore, courts hearing a derivative lawsuit will reject the 
claim and instead urge the shareholder partners to lodge a direct claim 
against their co-investors. We see this in the Beijing Jindao Hongping 
Advertising 2008/6 Beijing Glory Project 200917 and Shanghai Tianguang 
Medical 200918 cases. In the alternative, courts will allow mixed claims by 
the company: against both controlling shareholders for oppression and 
against fiduciaries (often the same parties as the controlling shareholders) 
for breach of fiduciary duties (typically the duty of loyalty).19 
If China's corporate landscape is dominated by closely held corporate 
partnerships then China's judiciary faces a difficult task in wielding the 
corporate derivative action with respect to them. Certainly, the 
16 Guo Hong v. Fu Ping re: Beijing Jindao Hongping Advertising Company Limited, Beijing 
Municipal Haidian District Basic-Level People's Court (2008), hai min chu zi 7380; on 
appeal Beijing no. 1 Intermediate People's Court (2008), yi zhongmin zhong zi no. 14669 
(available at http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo.com/Case/displaycontent.asp?Gid=1 1 757 4153) 
[Beijing findao Hongping Advertising 2008] . 
17 See Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008 and Beijing Glory Project 2009 cases. 
18 Shanghai fiaotong University Hospital Associated Ruijin Hospital v. Huatong TianxiangGroup 
Co., Ltd re: Shanghai Tianguang Biology Medical Technology Company Limited, Shanghai no. 
1 Intermediate People's Court (2008), hui yi zhong min san (shang) chu zi no. 4; on appeal 
Shanghai Higher People's Court (2009), hu gao min er (shang) zhong zi no. 18 (available at 
http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp?Gid= 1 17644889) [Shanghai Tianguang 
Medical2009]. 
19 See, for example, Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008. 
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mechanism will be useful in allowing a close corporation/corporate 
partnership registered as a company under the Company Law that has 
been damaged to sue those who have caused the damage (whether 
traditional fiduciaries or third parties) . Equally often, however, individ­
ual shareholders qua (effective) partners will suffer harm, and should be 
entitled to sue under a direct claim against co-equal partners (who are 
characterized as management in the corporate form). Thus, what may 
appear to be a failure to apply a new corporate doctrine (i.e., the non­
application of the new derivative lawsuit mechanism) may in fact be a 
highly competent and principled application of business enterprise law. 
The Dongfang Construction Group 2009 case20 demonstrates this: the 
0.68 per cent shareholder in an LLC sues a 10.78 per cent shareholder 
and company director for the gratis transfer of a significant receivable by 
the company to the defendant shareholder director without shareholder 
approval. The underlying breach is correctly identified as a breach of the 
investor director's duty of loyalty; more appropriately, the injury is 
described as being applicable to 'the company's other shareholders' 
(sunhaile gongsi qita gudong de quanyi) rather than 'the company', and 
thus the direct claim by the mere 0.68 per cent shareholder against 
another breaching shareholder is upheld. 
4 The legal representative 
Another somewhat unusual feature animating derivative lawsuits in the 
PRC is the singular position of the 'legal representative' (jading daibiao­
ren) in Chinese law and practice. Notwithstanding the election of direc­
tors and supervisors and appointment of officers, the position familiar 
from civil law systems is still used uniformly in Chinese corporations 
(and addressed in the 2006 Company Law). Although the new Company 
Law allows any duly appointed person to represent that legal person 
(pursuant to authorization by the shareholders or board of directors), the 
legal representative is, in the view of most PRC civil and judicial actors, 
intrinsically authorized to represent the company, and, in the (mistaken) 
view of many, exclusively authorized to act for the company. Moreover, 
for many corporate actors, only the specific person who is the legal 
2° Chen Ju v. Dongfang Construction Group Company Limited, Zhejiang Province Zhuji 
City District Basic-Level People's Court (2009), shao zhu shang chu zi no. 4058 (available 
at http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp?Gid= l l 7678194) [Dongfang 
Construction Group 2009] . 
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representative can affix the all-important corporate seals (or 'chops') 
necessary to confirm corporate action, such as the execution of contracts 
or the commencement of a lawsuit. Accordingly, many of the derivative 
lawsuits analysed in this chapter - especially in the LLC context - arise 
when the legal representative refuses to act for the company in enforcing 
an obligation or suing breaching fiduciaries, or refuses to give over the 
corporate chops necessary for corporate action. This situation may seem 
strange to lawyers used to the Western or Anglo-American system, but 
obstacles erected by an inactive or opposing legal representative who will 
not allow use of the corporate seals can be near-absolute, and in many 
cases trump the power of a unanimous shareholders' or board resolution 
(at least in the short term). 
5 The Chinese judiciary: local protectionism, Party control and 
the avoidance of 'mass' litigant  cases 
As noted earlier, the more important the political-economic actor 
involved in a lawsuit, the more likely the lawsuit is to be politically 
sensitive and subject to various kinds of obstacles and interference. 
The management and controlling shareholders of significant companies 
are likely to be influential - certainly in the area in which the company is 
headquartered, employs workers, and pays taxes, and often nationally as 
well. Indeed, the controlling shareholders may even be governmental or 
quasi-governmental bodies of some kind, or tied to Party organizational 
structures. Therefore, pressure may be brought to bear on courts to 
protect such actors from claims against them. Local political power -
formally, the local People's Congresses, and, in reality, the local 
Communist Party organization - controls courts both informally and 
formally through the power of appointment and power over budgets. 
This means that local Party and state officials - and those who have 
influence over them -have considerable power over courts. An extensive 
study of local protectionism in the courts found that, 'when confronted 
with interference, disturbance and influence exerted by various external 
forces, the judiciary has to surrender itself to the external pressure and 
cater for the needs of local interests'.21 Indeed, Communist Party 
21 Z. Liu, 'Zhongguo sifa difang baohu zhuyi zhi pipan - jianlun "sifaquan guojiahua" de 
sifa gaige silu' ['Critique of judicial local protectionism in China: reflections on "nation­
alization of judicial power" as the guideline for judicial reform'] (2003), Faxue Yanjiu 
[Legal Studies] 2003, 1: 83-98, 90. 
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committees can and do issue instructions to courts telling them how to 
handle particular cases. Some areas have a specific rule providing 
that, when a party from outside the jurisdiction sues a local enterprise, 
the court must get permission from the local Party leadership to hear the 
case, or the court is ordered to judge the case in accordance with the 
instructions of the Party committee.22 
Courts are particularly reluctant to get involved in lawsuits involving 
multiple plaintiffs or the interests of multiple parties, and various rules 
and practices reflecting the state's own distaste for such suits reinforce 
this reluctance. Sometimes courts directly instruct lower courts not to 
take multiple-plaintiff lawsuits at all.23 In securities litigation, which by 
its nature tends to involve many shareholder parties, the Supreme 
People's Court has issued instructions to lower courts that strictly limit 
the claims that litigants may make under the Securities Law, as well as the 
procedures for bringing them.24 The political sensitivity of group 
22 See D. Guo, 'Shixing sifa duli yu ezhi sifa fubai' ['Implementing judicial independence 
and preventing judicial corruption'] ( 1999), Falii Kexue [Law Science] 1999, 1: 5-15, 8; 
and Y. Wu, 'Sifa duli yu difang baohu zhuyi' ['Judicial independence and local protec­
tionism'] (2004), Hunan Gongan Gaodeng Zhuanke Xuexiao Xuebao [Journal of the 
Hunan Higher and Specialized Institutes of Public Security], 16, 2: 1 8-22, 19. 
23 One of us was informed by a Chinese law professor in 2006 that the Shanghai Higher­
Level People's Court had instructed all the lower courts in Shanghai not to accept suits 
with ten or more plaintiffs. The other of us found this kind of instruction, both explicit 
and 'internal' only, in an extensive review of corporate law and securities litigation in the 
Shanghai courts from 1992 to 2008; see N. Howson, 'Corporate law in the Shanghai 
People's Courts, 1992-2008: judicial autonomy in the contemporary authoritarian state' 
(2010), East Asia Law Review 5, 2: 303-440. 
24 See Supreme People's Court, Zuigao renrnin fayuan guanyu she zhengquan rninshi 
peichang anjian zan bu yu shouli de tongzhi' ['Notice on temporarily not accepting 
securities cases involving civil suits for damages'], issued 21 September 2001 (available at 
www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=16373); Supreme People's Court, 'Zuigao 
renrnin fayuan guanyu shouli zhengquan shichang yin xujia chenshu yin fa de rninshi 
jiufen anjian youguan wenti de tongzhi' ['Notice on issues relating to the acceptance of 
civil cases arising out of false representations in securities markets'] , issued 15 January 
2002 (available at www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=1 6956); and Supreme 
People's Court, 'Zuigao renrnin fayuan guanyu shenli zhengquan shichang yin xujia 
chenshu yin fa de rninshi peichang anjian de ruogan guiding' ['Several provisions on the 
adjudication of civil suits for damages arising out of false representations in securities 
markets'] ,  issued 9 January 2003 (available at www.law-lib.com/law!law_view.asp? 
id=42438). A judicial document issued to courts internally some time after a nationwide 
meeting on civil adjudication in May 2007 has apparently now broadened the scope of 
permissible claims to include market manipulation and insider trading, but other 
procedural hurdles established by the aforementioned documents still apply. See 
P. Luo, 'Qianzhi chengxu quliu kunjing ['Difficulties over whether to eliminate or 
keep the precondition procedure'] (2007), Caijing [Finance] 2007, 19: 28 (available at 
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litigation is further shown in the Supreme People's Court's efforts to 
push multi-plaintiff litigation down to the lowest level possible within 
the court system, so that plaintiff groups will not physically take their 
case to provincial capitals (if appeal lies with a higher-level people's 
court) or to Beijing (if appeal lies with the Supreme People's Court).25 
Courts have also sometimes required plaintiffs wishing to litigate 
together to separate their claims into smaller groups. In the first permit­
ted shareholder litigation on false or misleading disclosure, for example, 
the Harbin Intermediate Court required the original 381 plaintiffs to 
split up into smaller groups of ten to twenty persons.26 
Restrictions have also been placed on group litigation even before the 
plaintiffs get to court. In March 2006, for example, the All-China 
Lawyers Association - a government-controlled body that, together 
with the national Ministry of Justice and its local government counter­
part judicial bureaus, is in charge of lawyers in China - issued a regu­
lation entitled 'Guidance opinion on the handling by lawyers of mass 
cases', applying to all suits with ten or more plaintiffs.27 This regulation 
requires lawyers taking such cases to report to government bodies and 
'accept supervision and guidance' from them. 
Derivative suits are not, of course, class actions, and could in theory 
have a single initiating shareholder plaintiff. PRC judges will be aware, 
however, that derivative suits involving widely held or listed companies 
will necessarily implicate the interests, on one side, of large numbers of 
shareholders even if they are not formally plaintiffs and, on the other, of 
influential and politically backed corporate managers and controlling 
www.p5w.net/news/xwpl/200709/tl222550.htm); and X. Wu, 'Neimu jiaoyi, caozong 
shichang minshi peichang anjian hu zhi yu chu' ['Civil compensation cases for insider 
trading and market manipulation about to appear'] (2007), National People's Congress, 
18 November (available at http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/6543957.html). 
25 See Supreme People's Court, 'Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan shouli 
gongtong susong anjian wenti de tongzhi' ['Notice on the question of the acceptance by 
people's courts of joint litigation cases'], adopted 30 December 2005 (available at www. 
law-lib.com/law/law_ view.asp?id=14970 1 ),  para. 1 .  
26 See 'Daqing lianyi an jiannan tuijin' ['The Daqing Lianyi case is pushed ahead with 
difficulty'] ,  Nanfangzhoumo [Southern Weekend] (2003) ,  14 August (available at http:// 
finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20030814/ 1 108406286.shtml). 
27 All-China Lawyers Association, 'Guanyu ZUshi banli quntixing anjian zhidao yijian' 
[ 'Guiding opinion on the handling by lawyers of mass cases'] (2006), 20 March, www. 
acla.org.cn/pages/2006-5-15/s34852.html). For an English-language news report, see 
South China Morning Post, 'Warning to lawyers handling protest suits: new rules from 
government-controlled All-China Lawyers Association demand lawyers to be wary of 
foreign media contact' (2006), South China Morning Post, 19 May (available at www. 
asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=45908). 
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shareholders. It is therefore reasonable to think that much of the reluc­
tance to take multi-party suits with some political sensitivity will spill 
over into derivative suits in which widely held or listed companies are 
involved. 28 
6 Derivative versus representative 
The derivative action is the subject of considerable doctrinal confusion 
in China, affecting both the surrounding discourse and judgments in 
actual cases. Because the classic derivative action outside China often 
involves a large number of shareholders, for many years PRC analysts 
pointed to the 'group action' (gongtong susong) provided for in China's 
Law on Civil Procedure as somehow related to the shareholders' deriv­
ative action. This is plainly wrong: the group action in Chinese civil 
procedure merely allows for the aggregation of a number of litigants with 
the same or similar claims against one or a group of defendants. 
Similarly, many PRC experts and most opinion-writing judges refer to 
the derivative action as a 'representative action' (daibiao susan g), instead 
of the correct, directly translated term of art: paisheng [or yansheng] 
susong.29 Indeed, nowhere in the 2006 Company Law are any of these 
characters used for a derivative lawsuit; instead, article 1 52 speaks of 
shareholders bringing an action against defendants 'in their own 
names ... in the interest of the company' ('weile gongsi de liyi yi ziji de 
mingyi'). Just as with the 'group action' noted above, the 'representative 
action' applies only to a situation in which one party among a group of 
named litigants 'represents' the interests of the group in the judicial 
proceeding. This problem becomes substantively important, certainly 
28 As Professor Tang Xin of the Tsinghua University Law School states, ' [T]he court system 
is not active in hearing corporate and securities cases. Listed companies and their 
officers still have a certain political backing, and Chinese courts are neither experienced 
nor politically powerful and are hence reluctant to take cases involving complicated 
reasoning and powerful defendants.' X. Tang, 'Protecting minority shareholders in 
China: a task for both legislation and enforcement', in H. Kanda et al. (eds.) ,  
Transforming Corporate Governance in East Asia (2008), London: Routledge: 141-67, 
147; see also Howson ('Corporate law'), 400-13.  
2 9  Professor Liu Junhai makes it clear that the use of the misleading character set 'daibiao 
susong' ('representative lawsuit') arose because these are the same Chinese characters 
used in Japan's and Taiwan's corporate law. See J. Liu, Gufen youxian gongsi gudongquan 
de baohu [Protection of Shareholders' Rights in Companies Limited by Shares] , rev. edn. 
(2004), Beijing: Falii chubanshe [Law Press], 314-15. The great majority of the legal 
opinions we analyse in this chapter use the term 'daibiao susong' instead of the term of 
art that accurately conveys the derivative nature of the claim. 
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in the pre-2006 environment, when some litigants fight over the avail­
ability of a legal basis for 'derivative' versus 'representative' lawsuits.30 It 
also infects the ongoing conversation in the PRC regarding perfection of 
the derivative lawsuit, as, for example, when the Supreme People's Court 
justifies the 1 per cent shareholding threshold for CLS derivative actions 
because it ensures that the plaintiffs are in some sense 'representative' of 
all the shareholders' interest. 
7 Costs, cost allocation and cost-benefit analysis for shareholder 
plaintiffs 
If a lawsuit cannot be financed, it cannot occur. Typical financing mecha­
nisms include various combinations of contingency fees, a 'loser pays' rule, 
an order whereby the company whose interest is being protected bears the 
burden if the derivative suit is accepted (i.e., regardless of the success of the 
underlying claim), and a 'common fund' rule, in which the plaintiffs 
attorney's fees come from the corporate recovery, not the plaintiff. In 
addition, other jurisdictions, such as Taiwan, have experimented with a 
quasi-public foundation whose mission is to bring such lawsuits.31 
Chinese civil procedure is not now well suited to supporting these 
financing mechanisms. 32 The basic rule of Chinese civil procedure is that 
the loser pays various costs of litigation and court fees, but attorney's fees 
are not included in costs of litigation and so are borne directly by the 
parties.33 Filing fees in the PRC are calculated as a fraction of the amount 
in controversy, with plaintiffs usually required to pay such fees upfront 
before acceptance of the action?4 Moreover, law firms usually require a 
30 See, for example, Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003 (in which the court distinguishes 
between a 'representative' lawsuit brought by four plaintiffs on behalf of 165 other 
shareholders (for which there is a legal basis) and a 'derivative' lawsuit seeking remedy 
for harm to the company (for which there is, at the time, no explicit legal basis)). 
31 See C. Milhaupt, 'Nonprofit organizations as investor protection: economic theory and 
evidence from east Asia' (2004), Yale Journal of International Law 29, 1 :  169-207; Tang 
('Protecting minority shareholders'), 153-4; and Wallace Wen Yeu Wang and Wang 
Ruu Tseng's chapter on Taiwan in this volume. 
32 On issues of funding for derivative suits in China, see generally Z. Zhang, 'Making 
shareholder derivative actions happen in China: how should lawsuits be funded?' (2008), 
Hong Kong Law Journal 38, 2: 523-62. 
33 See State Council, 'Susong feiyong jiaona banfa' ['Measures for the payment of litigation 
costs'], effective 1 April 2007 (available at www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=184005), 
arts. 6, 29. 
34 See Civil Procedure Law, art. 107; and Supreme People's Court, 'Renminfayuan susong 
shoufei banfa' ('Provisions regarding collection of litigation fees by the people's courts'], 
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retainer to the value of over half of the total predicted fees. 35 Although 
these upfront payments may pose few difficulties for a corporate plaintiff 
of reasonable size, individual shareholder plaintiffs may find them diffi­
cult to make. 36 
Another way of funding derivative litigation is through contingency fees. 
In the post-Mao era of legal system construction, contingency fees in the 
PRC have been frowned upon. Over the past several years, however, they 
have come to be accepted in practice. In 2006 the central government issued 
a regulation specifically allowing contingency fees of up to 30 per cent, but 
not in a specified class of cases, including unpaid wages, spousal support, 
inheritance, marriage, and - most pertinently for our purposes - multi­
plaintiff lawsuits, underlining once again the state's particular concern with, 
and desire to discourage, this type of litigation.37 As noted above, derivative 
suits need not in form be multi-plaintiff lawsuits; a single initiating share­
holder will suffice. Assuming the state's concern is with the substantive 
spectacle of numerous interested parties and not with the mere form, 
however, it is reasonable to suppose that the policy might be applied to 
derivative suits involving widely held companies as well. 
It should be noted that to state the formal rule is not necessarily to 
describe actual practice, and therefore the system has more flexibility 
than might at first appear to be the case. Contingency fees have been 
allowed at a time when they were formally prohibited, and we show in 
this chapter that derivative suits themselves were allowed in practice 
before they were formally sanctioned in the 2006 Company Law. By the 
same token, even in the absence of specific statutory authorization, 
courts have on occasion shown hospitality to fee shifting in favour of 
winning plaintiffs, at least in consumer cases.38 In preliminary research 
issued 12 July 1989 (available at www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=5802); see also 
Zhang ('Making shareholder derivative actions') ,  559-61 ;  and X. Hong and S. Goo, 
'Derivative actions in China: problems and prospects' (2009), journal of Business Law 
2009, 4: 376-95, 392-3. 
35 See J. Xiao and X. Tang, 'Cost and fee allocation in civil procedure (China)', www. 
personal.umich.edu/-purzel/national_reports/China%20(PRC).pdf (last accessed 1 5  
December 20 1 1 ). 
36 Xiao and Tang ('Cost and fee allocation'), 10- 1 1 . 
37 See State Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Justice, 'Lushi fuwu 
shoulifei guanli ban fa' ['Measures on fees for lawyers' services'] ,  adopted 1 3  April 2006 
(available at www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id= 156310), art. 1 1 .  
38 See the discussion in D. Clarke, 'The private attorney-general in China: potential and 
pitfalls' (2009), Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8, 2: 241-55, 253-5; 
see also J. Tu, 'Liishifei you baisufang chengdan, you li yu minzhong xuanze falii 
shouduan baohu hefa quanyi' ['For the loser to pay attorneys' fees is advantageous to 
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on this issue, one of us found that, in more than half the cases in which 
plaintiffs asked for attorneys' fees and won their case, the courts were 
willing as a matter of law to award attorneys' fees. It appears, therefore, 
that in practice the rule against awards of attorneys' fees is not an 
insuperable obstacle. The real question is whether courts will be willing 
as a practical matter to do so. 39 
III Derivative actions before 2006 
Despite the absence of a firm statutory basis in law, derivative actions 
were accepted and heard in Chinese courts before 2006 and the entry 
into force of the 2006 Company Law. The history of derivative actions 
before their formal recognition in law shows that, when they desire to do 
so, Chinese courts in both their rule-making and adjudicatory capacities 
can readily create and apply rules on their own, even when they run 
counter to formally superior rules. 
In this section, we find a pattern that is quite common in other fields of 
Chinese law: a central-level policy disfavouring a practice, limited exper­
imentation with the practice at sub-central levels (often through the 
courts), and eventual formal incorporation into central-level norms. 
We further find lower-court practice occasionally overstepping the 
bounds laid out by apparently 'superior' statute, higher courts, and 
regulatory authorities. 
1 Non-statutory rule making: CSRC principles, SPC utterances, 
local 'opinions', and the (draft) 'Omnibus' regulation on the 1994 
Company Law 
Prior to 2006, in spite of the absence of enabling legislation from the 
centre, local governments and non-legislative bodies were not idle. In 
January 2002 the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued its 
'Principles of corporate governance for listed companies',40 which states 
in article 4 (emphasis added): 
the people's choosing legal methods to protect their lawful rights and interests'] (2009), 
5 January, www.lawyn.com (available at http://tinyurl.com/rSmxdt). 
39 In the cases reviewed here, we find evidence only of a court-mandated sharing of 
litigation filing fees, etc., and no recitation of how attorneys' fees were allocated. See 
footnotes 1 06 and 1 07 and accompanying text. 
4° China Securities Regulatory Commission, 'Shangshi gongsi zhili zhunze' ['Principles of 
corporate governance for listed companies'] ,  issued 7 January 2002 (available at www. 
law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=1 6889). 
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The directors, supervisory board members, and managers of the com­
pany shall bear liability for compensation in cases where they violate law, 
administrative regulation, or the articles of association and cause damage 
to the company during the performance of their duties. Shareholders 
shall have the right to request the company to sue for such compensation 
in accordance with law. 
As authorization for a derivative lawsuit in China, the 'Principles' have 
several defects. First, and most obviously, they are not legislation. They are, 
in effect, suggestions from the CSRC as to how companies should organize 
their internal governance. They provide no legal basis for shareholders to 
bring, or courts to accept, derivative pleadings. Second, they merely author­
ize the shareholders to request that the company sue. Shareholders did not 
need the 'Principles' to authorize them to communicate with directors and 
officers about desired corporate action, however. What is special about 
demand in derivative actions is that typically it is a required step, and a 
condition precedent, not simply an authorized one. Indeed, shareholders 
wishing to sue on behalf of the company might be happier without it. 
Less than a year later, in December 2002, a senior Supreme People's 
Court judge stated publicly that courts should accept derivative suits.41 
A lower court subsequently found these remarks inadequate as a basis 
for accepting a derivative suit, calling them 'for reference only'.42 
Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the remarks were a 
sign of internal conversations taking place within the court system. 
For example, from late 2002 to 2004 the higher-level people's courts (one 
level below the Supreme People's Court and responsible for courts at the 
provincial level) of Jiangsu, Shanghai and Beijing all issued 'Opinions'43 
permitting the use of the derivative suit mechanism in courts under their 
41 See Beijing yule xinbao [Beijing Recreation News] , 'Gao fayuan fuyuanzhang Li 
Guoguang biaoshi: xiao gudong gao da gudongfayuan ying shouli' ['Supreme People's 
Court vice-president Li Guoguang indicates that courts should accept suits by small 
shareholders against large shareholders'] (2002), Beijing yule xinbao, 12 December 
(available at http://news.sohu.com/58/64/news204906458.shtml). 
42 See Shanghai zhengquan bao [Shanghai Securities News], 'Shouli gudong daibiao susong 
wei bei shouli' ['First shareholder representative suit is not accepted'] (2003), Shanghai 
zhengquan bao, 22 April (available at http://10l .stock888.net/030422/1 00,101,7801 5,00. 
shtml); see also W. Qian, 'Gongsi susong: gongsi sifa jiuji fangshi xin lun ( 6)' ['Corporate 
litigation: a new discussion of methods of judicial remedies for companies (6)'] (2003), 
chinalawinfo.com, 23 May, http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display. 
asp? ArticleiD=25304. 
43 Chinese courts below the Supreme People's Court level and governmental bodies often 
issue documents labelled 'Opinions' (yijian) setting forth proposed rules on various 
issues. Opinions can be binding in varying degrees. They should not be confused with 
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jurisdiction, and describing their implementation in great detail.44 For 
example, the 'Shanghai Opinion' affirms the inclusion of controlling 
shareholders and third parties as potential defendants; identifies the 
participation of the company as a 'third party'; authorizes judicial deter­
mination of whether the company has been harmed, the causal connec­
tion between the defendants' actions and the harm, any good-faith 
defences available to the defendants, and the degree of control exercised 
by the controlling shareholder defendant over the corporate entity 
inhibiting the underlying action; forbids settlement that will disadvant­
age the real parties in interest (minority shareholders in the company);45 
empowers the court to annul offending transactions; and allows for 
damage awards against not just the defendants but also the company. 
This level of detail is strong evidence that local-level courts were in fact 
accepting and adjudicating derivative lawsuits well before 2006. In fact, 
one pre-2006 case report in our sample46 actually cites the 'Beijing 
Opinion' (article 8) as the basis for a derivative claim, which fails because 
of no demand. 
the term 'opinion', as used to indicate a court decision in a particular case, or 'explan­
ations' (jieshi) or 'regulations' (guiding) issued by the Supreme People's Court. 
44 See Jiangsu Higher-Level People's Court, 'Guanyu shenli shiyonggongsifa anjian ruogan 
wenti de yijian (shixing) (2003 nian 6 yue)' ['Opinions on several issues on adjudicating 
cases applying company law (trial implementation) (June 2003)'], in Shanghai Higher 
People's Court (ed.), Gongsifa yinan wenti jiexi (di san ban) [Company Law Issues: 
Problems and Analysis] 3rd edn. (2006), Beijing: Falii chubanshe, 240-8 ['Jiangsu 
Opinion']; Shanghai Higher-Level People's Court, no. 2 Civil Division, 'Guanyu shenli 
sheji gongsi susong anjian ruogan wenti de chuli yijian (yi)' ['Opinions on adjudicating 
cases regarding corporate litigation (no. I) ' ] ,  in Shanghai Higher People's Court (ed.), 
Company Law Issues, 231-6 ['Shanghai opinion']; and Beijing Higher-Level People's 
Court, 'Guanyu shenli gongsi jiufen anjian ruogan wenti de zhidao yijian (shixing) (2004 
nian 2 yue)' ['Guiding opinions on several issues on adjudicating corporate dispute cases 
(trial implementation) (February 2004)'], in Shanghai Higher People's Court (ed.), 
Company Law Issues, 236-40 ['Beijing Opinion'] .  
4 5  For the concern in one of our reported cases, which apparently made it to the Supreme 
People's Court before being settled, see Zhejiang Hexin Electric Power Development 
Company Limited & Jinhua City Daxing Materials Company Limited v. Tonghe Zhiye 
Investment Company Limited re: Tonghe Investment Holding Company Limited, Zhejiang 
Higher People's Court and Supreme People's Court (2009), reported at http://www.legal­
daily. com.cn/ajzj/content/2009-07/22/content_1 126739.htm and http:/ /www.legaldaily. 
com.cn/zmbm/content/2009-08/27 /content_1 144482.htm [Tonghe Investment 2009] . 
46 Hantang Jicheng Co., Ltd (Taiwan) v. Chen Shihu, Lin Cangmin and Gan Wenqi re: 
Beijing Taiqun Technology Company Limited, unidentified Beijing Basic-Level People's 
Court (after 2003); on appeal Beijing no. 2 Intermediate People's Court (after 2005), 
reported at http://www.tpan.cn/html!4769.htm [Beijing Taiqun Technology 2006] . 
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The Supreme People's Court also demonstrated its approval in a 
more formal way than through casual remarks by senior judges. As 
early as 1994, in connection with the Zhangjiagang Fiber Company 
1994 case noted immediately below, it had issued a document approving 
a derivative-type action by the Jiangsu courts (the 'Approving 
Response') . Then in 2003, with significant PRC academic input, it dis­
tributed for comment a draft regulation (the 'Omnibus Regulation') for 
lower courts that substantially rewrote the Company Law and, inter alia, 
provided for a derivative suit mechanism.47 Finally, in 2005 - and on the 
eve of the coming into effect of the 2006 Company Law with the new 
article 152 in it - the Supreme People's Court approved a decision of the 
Beijing Higher-Level People's Court recognizing a derivative action.48 
2 Pre-2006 cases 
Several cases arising before 2006 show how the derivative suit mecha­
nism was implemented in practice, sometimes in accordance with the 
documents and regulations described above, sometimes by the PRC 
courts acting entirely autonomously. 
a Genesis of the 1 994 SPC Approving Response 
and other LLC cases 
Case collections and opinions show that, well before 1 January 2006, 
PRC plaintiffs brought derivative pleadings to court, and Chinese courts 
accepted derivative pleadings or affirmatively restructured claims to 
allow pleadings on behalf of corporate entities. There are, of course, 
limits to the conclusions we can draw from these opinions; we do not 
47 See Supreme People's Court, 'Guanyu shenligongsi jiufen anjian ruogan wenti de guiding 
(yi) (zhengqiu yijian gao)' ['Regulation regarding several problems on hearing company 
dispute cases (first) (comment draft)'] ,  issued 4 November 2003 (available at http:// 
www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=8855 1)  [Omnibus Regulation] .  The draft 
regulation never made it to the stage of formal issuance, and was made moot by the 
2006 Company Law. 
48 Suzhou New Development Investment Company Limited & Y ankuang Group Company v. 
Qingdao Qianxi Hongda Sports Recreation Company Limited, Sichuan Hongda (Group) 
Company Limited, Sichuan Hongda Ltd, Co. re: China Zhongqi Futures Broker Company 
Limited, Beijing Higher People's Court (2004), gao min chu zi no. 1287; affirmed on 
appeal (after withdrawal of original defendants' appeal) Supreme People's Court (2006), 
min er zhongzi no. 56 [China Zhongqi Futures 2004-6]; reproduced in J. Zhao and G. Wu 
(eds.), Ban an quancheng shilu - gudong daibiao susong [True Records of Complete 
Course of Case Handling: The Shareholders' Representative Lawsuit] (2007), Beijing: Falii 
chubanshe, 263-74, 306-7. 
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know, for example, whether such accepted cases, or the cases that 
actually went to trial and produced an opinion, represent a large or a 
small proportion of attempts to file such suits. 
The first acknowledgement of the derivative mechanism after the 
promulgation of the 1994 Company Law came in the Zhangjiagang 
Fiber Company 1994 case,49 which gave rise to the Supreme People's 
Court Approving Response noted above. This case was in the limited 
area of foreign-invested enterprises, and, initially at least, apparently 
relevant only to Chinese-foreign equity or cooperative joint ventures in 
which the foreign investor was also the technology licensor/transferor to 
the same joint venture. As we show immediately below, however, the 
same case, the permitted derivative action, and the Approving Response 
were all used to support a post-2006 judgment (on pre-2006 facts) 
concerning an entirely domestically invested venture. 
In the Zhangjiagang Fiber Company 1994 case, the Jiangsu Higher 
People's Court asked the Supreme People's Court for guidance on the 
question of whether a factory, the Chinese investor in a Chinese-foreign 
equity joint venture, could represent the JV in suing a vendor to the JV 
(and a related party to the foreign investor in the JV). The SPC 
responded that the Chinese factory could indeed exercise the litigation 
rights of the JV, but in this particular case would not be able to do so 
because of a pre-existing arbitration agreement in the contract between 
the JV and the vendor. 
This was a first specific acknowledgement by the apex of the PRC 
judiciary of the legitimacy of a derivative action, although it was hedged 
with so many conditions that it made it appear of limited broader 
applicability. The Approving Response quickly proved useful in non­
FIE-related cases, however. For instance, it was cited as a legal basis in 
the pre-2006 CLS-related Zhejiang Wu Fang Zhai 2001 case. 5° Then, in a 
49 Described in Supreme People's Court, 'Guanghu zhongwai hezi jingying qiye duiwai 
fashengjingji hetongjiufen, kongzhi heying qiye de waifang yu maifang you lihai guanxi, 
heying qiye de zhongfang ying yi shei de mingyi xiang renmin fauan qisu wenti de Juhan' 
('Reply letter on the issue of in whose name the Chinese party to a Chinese-foreign 
equity joint venture should bring suit when the joint venture has an economic dispute 
with an external party and the foreign party controlling the joint venture has a relation­
ship of interest with the seller'] , issued 4 November 1994 (available at http://www. 
people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/ dwjif/falv /9/9-1-4-0 1 .html). 
50 Described in P. Luo, Gongsifa de hetong jieshi [A Contractual Interpretation of Company 
Law] (2004), Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe [Beijing University Press] ,  335-6; X. Lu, 
'Dongshizhang zi tao yaobao pei 250 wan; zhiyi wu fang zhai shijian' ['Chairman of the 
board compensates 2.5 million from his own wallet; questions about the Wu Fang Zhai 
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second important case - the largest derivative-action-related award to 
date in the PRC - the Guangdong Higher-Level People's Court used the 
1994 Supreme People's Court Approving Response as the basis for 
ordering damages of 400 million yuan to an entirely domestic enter­
prise. 51 This Guangzhou Tianhe Sci tech 2003 decision is noteworthy not 
only for its use of the 1994 SPC Approving Response when FIEs were not 
involved, but also because the Guangdong court issued its judgment after 
1 January 2006. This means that it could have applied the newly effective 
article 152 of the 2006 Company Law to the facts of the case (as our later 
discussion of 'straddling'52 will make clear), but chose not to do so. The 
1994 SPC Approving Response also proved immensely useful to the 
plaintiff shareholder in the Guangzhou case, as it allowed the court to 
reject the defendant's sensible assertion that the derivative pleadings 
should be thrown out because the plaintiff shareholder had not complied 
with the pre-suit demand requirements of article 1 52.53 
case'] (200 1 ) ,  Caijing Shibao [Finance and Economic Times] , 27 July (available at http:/ I 
www.finance.sina.com.cn/g/20010727/88091 .html); and 'Dou shi danbao re de huo; 
dongshizhang bei gudong gaodao' ['A disaster all caused by a guarantee; chairman of 
the board brought down by shareholder suit'] (2001), Jiancha ribao [Procuratorial 
Daily] , 27 july (available at http://chinalawlib.com/358543998.html) [Zhejiang Wu 
Fang Zhai 2001 ] .  
51 Guangzhou Municipal Tianhe Science and Technology Park Construction Company 
Limited v. Guangdong Zhujiang Investment Company Limited, Liao Ruoqing, 
Nambour Properties Limited re: Guangzhou Tianhe Science and Technology Park 
Enterprise Management Company Limited, Guangdong Province Higher People's 
Court (2003), yue gao fa min chuzi no. 5 (available at www.union-lawyer.org.cn/ 
news_1 30) [Guangzhou Tianhe Scitech 2003] . 
52 As described below, straddling actions are those that use the 2006 Company Law after 1 
january 2006 to adjudicate facts arising before 1 january 2006. 
53 This is a defence that works very well in a number of the post-2006 cases noted here, such as 
Wang Bin v. Wang Yuanquan and Beijing Peieryou Technology Company Limited re: 
Shanghai Peieryou Technology Company Limited, unidentified Shanghai Basic-Level 
People's Court; on appeal Shanghai no. 1 Intermediate People's Court (after 2006) (available 
at www.qzfz.qz.gov.cn/about.asp?ID=2621) [Shanghai Peieryou 2006]; Zhao Yu v. Zhou 
Yuchao re: Shunde Municipal Zhaoyu Electronic Hardware Company Limited, Guangdong 
Province Foshan Municipal Shunde District Basic-Level People's Court (2006), shun fa 
miner chuzi no. 02196; on appeal Guangdong Province Foshan Intermediate People's Court 
(2007), fo zhong fa miner zhongzi no. 348 (available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/Case/ 
displaycontent.asp?Gid=1 17521884) [Shunde Zhaoyu Electronic Hardware 2007]; Zhang Ke 
v. Zhang Chen re: Beijing Dingyu Special Type Electric Cable Company Limited, Beijing 
Municipal Haidian District Basic-Level People's Court (2008), hai min chuzi no. 23873 
(available at http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo.com/Case/ displaycontent.asp?Gid= 1 17618469) [Beijing 
Dingyu Cable 2008]; and Qian Qingwen and Chen Xiaobing v. Gao Weiyong re: Kunming 
Kangpaili Technology Company Limited, Kunming Municipal Wuhua District Basic-Level 
People's Court (2008), wu fa min san chu zi no. 253; on appeal Kunming Intermediate 
People's Court (2009), kun min wu zhongzi no. 49 (available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/ 
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After the 1994 Supreme People's Court Approving Response there is 
evidence of other derivative pleadings in the Chinese courts in a number 
of cases from 1996 to 2005.54 Most interesting for this chapter is the fact 
that, in these cases, Chinese courts on their own reasoned their way to 
the derivative action in order to provide plaintiffs with a remedy. As the 
report of the Xiamen Xinda 1 997 case stated, 
If the infringement suffered by the shareholder is to the rights of the 
company, then the shareholder should first present a written application 
to the organ of power of the company requesting that the company take 
action or bring litigation against the party inflicting the harm and pursue 
its legal liability. Where the company does not take any action, the 
shareholder may in its stead bring a lawsuit. 55 
Alternatively, as the opinion in the Unknown Beijing Parties 2001 case 
reasoned, 
Case/displaycontent.asp?Gid=l l7674614) [Kunming Kangpaili Technology 2009] ; but see, 
contra, Beijing Golden Century 2009; and Shi Jianjun v. Qian Guoli, Qian Guojun, Zhou 
Guojin, Xu Xuejun, Zheng Dongsheng, and Shi Huifang re: Huangshan Municipal Fenghua 
Real Estate Development Company Limited, Huangshan Municipal Intermediate People's 
Court (2004), huang zhang fa min er chu zi no. 21; and, after remand (2005), huang zhongfa 
min er chu zi no. 24; on appeal Anhui Provincial Higher People's Court (2009), wan min er 
zhang zi no. 0163 (available at http:l/www.vip.chinalawinfo.com/Case/displaycontent.asp? 
Gid=117684487) [Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009] . 
54 See the Shanghai Yanzhong Water Company 1996-7 case, as described by J. Deng, 
'Building an investor-friendly shareholder derivative lawsuit system in China' (2005), 
Harvard International Law Journal 46, 2: 347-85, 366-7 [Shanghai Yanzhong Water 
Company 1996-7]; the Xiamen Xinda 1 997 case, as described by Z. Xie and M. Chen, 
'Gudong paisheng susong zai sikao' ['Rethinking shareholder derivative suits'] (2001),  
Fujian zhengfa guanli ganbu xueyuan xuebao [Journal of the Fujian Political-Legal 
Administrative Cadre Institute] 2001 ,  4: 24-7, 24 [Xiamen Xinda 1997]; the Beijing 
Taishan 2000 case, as described by R. Zhang and L. Wang, 'Ben an gudong shifou you 
quan chongdang yuan gao daibiao gongsi tiqi susong' ['Does the shareholder in this case 
have the right to take the role of plaintiff and bring suit on behalf of the company?'] 
(2004), Renmin fa yuan wang [People's Court Net], 31 May www.chinacourt.org/publicl 
detail.php?id=l l79 1 5  [Beijing Taishan 2000] ; a case reproduced by Beijing no. 1 
Intermediate People's Court (no. 4 Civil Division) (ed.), Gongsifa shenpan shiwu dia­
nxing anli pingxi [Company Law Hearing Guide: Critique and Analysis of Representative 
Cases] (2005), Beijing: Zhongguo jianchayuan chubanshe [China Procuratorate Press]:  
359-70 [ Unknown Beijing Parties 2001 ] ,  trans. N. Howson, 'The doctrine that dared not 
speak its name: Anglo-American fiduciary duties in China's 2005 Company Law and 
case law intimations of prior convergence', in H. Kanda et al. (eds.), Transforming 
Corporate Governance in East Asia (2008), London: Routledge: 193-254; Huangshan 
Fenghua Real Estate 2009; and Beijing Taiqun Technology 2006. 
55 See Xie and Chen ('Rethinking'), 24. 
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In the present case, because [defendant A] is the chairman of the board of 
directors of the company and because by law and under the company's 
articles of association he convenes the board meeting and presides over it, 
he should be responsible for calling a board meeting so that the board can 
make resolutions regarding major issues that arise in the course of 
company operations. [Plaintiff] believes that board chairman [defendant 
A] and general manager [defendant B] have taken actions which injure 
the interests of the company. In this situation, there is no way that 
[defendant A],  as a conflicted party, will convene a board meeting to 
address his own actions, just as there is no way he can represent the 
company in bringing litigation [against himself] . Thus, [the plaintiff], as 
a shareholder of the company, has the ability to represent the company in 
appropriate litigation, with the goal behind the litigation being to protect 
the lawful rights and interests of the company and its [other] 
shareholders. 56 
Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme People's Court itself implic­
itly affirmed a derivative action before 2006 - and in an actual case 
decision,57 not in an 'approving response' like the 1994 instruction 
engendered by the Zhangjiagang Fiber Company 1994 case. In affirming 
a lower-court judgment allowing a derivative-type action, on 18 
December 2005 the SPC also implicitly affirmed the viability of deriva­
tive pleadings in the Chinese courts.58 
b Widely held companies 
Almost all the successful cases involving derivative pleadings from 
before 2006 involve close corporations - usually LLCs. There is evidence, 
56 See Unknown Beijing Parties 2001, 362-3. The (unidentified) second-instance court 
hearing the appeal, and even the Beijing intermediate court judge commenting on the 
case, do not take issue with this derivative claim apparently constructed out of whole 
cloth. 
57 See China Zhongqi Futures 2004-6. 
58 This was only after the promulgation of the new (2006) Company Law form, however, 
including article 152, which would become effective just thirteen days later. The lawyers 
representing the plaintiffs note wryly that the Beijing Higher People's Court rendered its 
judgment without once invoking the idea of, or legal basis for, 'derivative' or 'share­
holders' representative' actions, and seemed to accept without comment the idea that 
these shareholders are allowed to plead a cause of action on behalf of the corporation 
they are invested in. See J. Zhao and G. Wu, Zhongguo IUshi ban'an quancheng shilu: 
gudong daibiao susong [Complete Record of Case Handling for Chinese Lawyers: 
Shareholder Representative Suits] (2007), Beijing: Falii chubanshe, 274. 
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however, that Chinese courts accepted at least a few derivative cases 
involving CLSs, and even publicly listed companies. 59 
A remarkable pre-2006 case involving a CLS60 indicates some of the 
stakes involved in CLS-related cases, publicly listed or not. The case 
arose from the promotion of a CLS just as China's 1994 Company Law 
went into effect, and the receipt - on trust - by a company run by the 
Shaoxing County government of 35 million yuan from more than 160 
public investors for the capitalization of a future CLS, in which the 
trustee was to also be a 30 per cent shareholder. The trustee company 
never forwarded the funds to the CLS after it had been established, and 
so upon liquidation the public shareholders sued the trustee company on 
behalf of the CLS. The case and the resulting opinion are remarkable 
because of the politically powerful parties involved as defendants, the 
pleading of the Shaoxing County government as a named defendant on 
what resembles a piercing theory to be jointly and severally liable with its 
alter ego, the acceptance of a case involving a widely held CLS (and 
almost 170 irate investors), and the sophisticated reasoning that permits 
a shareholder derivative action despite the lack of statutory basis for it at 
the time. As the judges in the case state: 
[A]lthough the party directly harmed by inappropriate action by the 
controlling shareholder is the company, it is extremely difficult for the 
company to defend its rights in its own name when it is under the control 
of the p arty acting inappropriately. [ . . .  ] We do not agree with [the 
defendants'] responsive assertion that the plaintiff has no power to 
represent the company to bring the litigation. [ . . .  ] To protect the rights 
and interest of the company, the listing of the [company] as a third party 
in this case is not in violation of Article 56 of the PRC Civil Procedure 
Law.61 
This kind of case, involving a widely held CLS with a large number of 
shareholders as plaintiffs and with government-controlled corporate 
entities and government departments as defendants, will remain very 
59 See Zhejiang Wu Fang Zhai 2001; Li Kai v. Henan Lianhua MSG Co., Ltd and Lianhua 
Group Company, Daqing Municipal Ranghu Road Basic People's Court (2004), reported 
in Shanghai Zhengquanbao [Shanghai Securities Daily] (2004), 7 July [Henan Lianhua 
MSG 2004]; and Shanghai Yaoguo Energy Science and Technology Company Limited v. 
Gao Baoquan re: Shanghai Lujiazui United Real Estate Company Limited, Shanghai no. 1 
Intermediate People's Court (2005), hu yi zhang min san (shan g) chuzi no. 26; on appeal 
Shanghai Higher People's Court (2005), hu gao min er (shang) zhongzi no. 188 (available 
at http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo.com/Case/displaycontent.asp?Gid=1 1 75 18355) [Shanghai 
Lujiazui 2005] . 
60 See Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003. 61 Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003. 
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rare even after an unambiguous statutory basis is provided in the 2006 
Company Law. 
IV The 2006 Company Law and statutory authorization 
for derivative actions 
The derivative lawsuit mechanism authorized in article 152 of the 2006 
Company Law is distinct from the derivative action received from the 
Anglo-American or Continental traditions, including the systems in 
place for the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Japan. 
Article 152's rule cannot be stated simply, because it makes several 
distinctions not found in the systems of other countries. First, the 
procedural rules distinguish between LLCs and CLSs. Second, the sub­
stantive claims that may be brought on behalf of the company allow 
claims against both ( 1 )  traditional corporate fiduciaries (directors, offi­
cers and supervisors) and (2) what are called 'others', which includes 
controlling shareholders and third parties (with the basis of the under­
lying claims against each also differing slightly). 
The rule may be summarized as follows. 
( 1 )  Defendants and associated causes of actions. Initiating shareholders 
may bring a derivative lawsuit against (i) directors, supervisory 
board members or senior management who have violated law 
({alii) ,  administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui)62 or company 
articles of association in the course of performing company duties, 
thereby causing damage to the company (gei gongsi zaocheng sun­
shi), and (ii) 'others' who violate the company's lawful rights and 
interests, thereby causing damage to the company. 
(2) Standing. In CLSs, initiating plaintiffs must collectively satisfy a 
1 per cent shareholding requirement and must have held their shares 
for 180 days. There are no comparable requirements for plaintiffs in 
LLCs. 
(3) Demand requirements. Before bringing an action against directors or 
senior management, shareholders must first make a written demand 
62 In this context, 'law' and 'administrative regulations' are terms of art, referring respec­
tively to norms promulgated by ( 1 )  the National People's Congress or its Standing 
Committee, and (2) the State Council. Regulations issued by central government min­
istries, for example, would not count as 'administrative regulations' (xingzheng fagui). 
See P.  Keller, 'Sources of order in Chinese law' ( 1994), American Journal of Comparative 
Law 42, 4: 71 1-59. 
270 DONALD C. CLARKE AND NICHOLAS C. HOWSON 
on the board of supervisors (or individual supervisors in case there is 
no supervisory board) . Before bringing an action against supervi­
sors, shareholders must first make a demand on the board of direc­
tors (or the executive director where there is no board of directors). 
The plaintiff may proceed with the suit if (i) the demand is rejected, 
(ii) the demand is not acted upon within thirty days or (iii) the 
company would suffer irreparable damage if the suit could not 
proceed immediately. 
We discuss each element of the rule in more detail below, but first note 
the following two contextual points about other new parts of the Company 
Law introduced in 2006. First, this new action in law must be distinguished 
from a separate cause of action - similar in philosophy to direct actions 
under the 1994 Company Law and the 1999 Securities Law - accruing 
directly to shareholders for unlawful acts by directors or senior manage­
ment (but not supervisory board members) that 'damage the interests of 
shareholders' (sunhai gudong liyi).63 Second, aside from the innovative 
derivative action embodied in article 152, the 2006 Company Law is note­
worthy for its expanded list of permitted claims against directors, senior 
management and supervisory board members, as well as compensation 
obligations directed to the company as a potential beneficiary, including: 
a breach of the duty of care and duty of loyalty;64 compensation for 
corporate losses arising from board action that is in violation of law, 
administrative regulation, the company articles of association, or share­
holders' resolutions (except when a director has affirmatively dissented);65 
the restitution of ill-gotten gains arising from specific duty of loyalty 
breaches;66 and compensation for losses arising from related-party trans­
actions (apparently whether or not disclosed and approved) .67 The deriv­
ative action added in 2006 is thus, at least potentially, the procedural vehicle 
for a much-expanded roster of substantive claims. 
1 Standing 
As noted above, there are special standing requirements for shareholders 
of CLSs. First, they must have held their shares for at least 180 
63 2006 Company Law, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongsi fa [Company Law of the 
People's Republic of China] , effective 1 January 2006 (available at www.law-lib.com/ 
law!law_viewl .asp?id=102906), art. 153. 
64 2006 Company Law, art. 1 48.  65 2006 Company Law, art. 1 1 3. 
66 2006 Company Law, art. 149 (final para.). 67 2006 Company Law, art. 2 1 .  
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consecutive days. The statute does not stipulate that the shareholders 
bringing the demand must have been shareholders at the time the cause 
of action arose and thus rejects the first prong of the US-origin 'con­
temporary ownership rule'.68 It seems unlikely that the failure to specify 
the first prong of the COR is an oversight; the 2003 Omnibus Regulation 
made this rule explicit, showing that experts were aware of the issue.69 
An alternative rule proposed in the 2003 Omnibus Regulation - that the 
six-month holding period be satisfied before the cause of action arises ­
was also rejected, making the promulgated article 1 52's rule the least 
burdensome on plaintiffs of those that were apparently under serious 
consideration. 
Interestingly, article 152 does not explicitly state that those initiating 
the suit must be shareholders at the time of making the demand, 
although it would strain the statutory language to read it any other 
way: after all, it states that 'shareholders' must make the demand. It 
seems fairly clear, then, that those initiating the suit have to be share­
holders when they bring the suit to court; it is a basic rule of Chinese civil 
procedure that plaintiffs must have a direct interest in the matter to be 
litigated, and it is hard to see what the interest of non-shareholders 
(other than corporate creditors, of course) could be in a corporate 
recovery. The first regulations issued by the Supreme People's Court 
on the 2006 Company Law also suggests (albeit with less than perfect 
clarity) that the holding period (discussed below) needs to extend to the 
date that the lawsuit is brought.70 In no case that we have reviewed for 
this chapter is the initiating plaintiff not a shareholder at the time of the 
lawsuit. 
Other civil law systems tend to require that a shareholder seeking to 
initiate a derivative lawsuit ( 1 )  be a shareholder at the time of demand, 
and (2) have been a shareholder for a set period of time previously, 
ignoring the question of whether the demanding party was a shareholder 
at the time the cause of action arose. For example, the Japanese Company 
Law requires only that the demanding party have been a shareholder for 
68 See Delaware General Corporation Law, sect. 327. 
69 See Omnibus Regulation, art. 44. 
70 See Supreme People's Court, Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shiyong 'Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Gongsi Fa' ruogan wenti de guiding (1)' ['Provisions of the Supreme People's 
Court about several issues concerning the application of the Company Law of the 
People's Republic of China ( 1 ) ] ,  effective 9 May 2006 (available at www.law-lib.com/ 
law/law_view.asp?id=1 58579) [First Company Law Regulations] .  
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six months prior to the demand; in Germany the period is three months, 
and in Taiwan it is one year. 
The second standing requirement for shareholders in CLSs is that they 
must collectively own at least 1 per cent of the CLS's outstanding shares. 
There is no ownership threshold for LLC shareholders. As with the 
holding period requirement, article 152's approach is more plaintiff­
friendly than the 2003 Omnibus Regulation, which duplicated the 
requirement for CLS shareholders but imposed a 10 per cent require­
ment for LLC shareholders. By comparison, US state and Japanese 
corporate law systems do not stipulate a minimum percentage of hold­
ings before a demand may be made, although some US states allow 
courts to order the posting of a bond before the demand is made if the 
shareholding percentage (or value) is deemed too low. Civil law systems 
do generally stipulate minimum shareholder percentages - for example, 
10 per cent in Germany and 5 per cent in France. Influential adjacent 
systems, such as Taiwan and South Korea, also provide for minimums: 
1 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively. As we note in this chapter, the 
minimum shareholding requirement for CLSs threatened to defeat at 
least one high-profile derivative action attempted after the coming into 
force of the 2006 Company Law.71 
2 Demand 
The 2006 Company Law explicitly requires that a demand be made in 
writing to the appropriate body. This requirement is a nod to the 
principle of the exhaustion of intra-corporate remedies - a concept we 
see raised frequently in Chinese pleadings and opinions. In reality, 
however, intra-corporate remedies seem irrelevant; the only thing that 
can stop the plaintiff from bringing suit is the corporation's bringing suit 
itself. Unlike many other derivative lawsuit mechanisms internationally, 
there is no room for the corporation to argue that a lawsuit would not be 
in the corporation's interests, or that it has obtained adequate non­
litigious remedies for the wrongdoing. 
71 This is the Sanlian Shangshe 2009 case, which was finally accepted by the Shandong 
Higher People's Court in December 2009. The case is described in 'ST Sanlian shangshe 
xiao gudong susong sanlian jituan qinquan zhengshi lian' ['ST Sanlian Shangshe minor­
ity shareholder suit against Sanlian Group for infringement is formally docketed'] 
(2009), Qianlongwang [Thousand Dragons Net] , 16 December, http://qy.qianlong. 
com/7440/2009/12/16/4722@5353758.htm. 
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Although article 152 improves on the 2003 Omnibus Regulation 
formulation by generally specifying on whom demand has to be 
made,72 it does not specify on whom demand should be made when 
seeking corporate action not against traditional fiduciaries but against 
non-insider 'others'. One PRC writer opines that, in such cases, demand 
should be made first on the legal representative, then on the board of 
directors and finally on the board of supervisors, in each case waiting 
thirty days for a response. 73 We see this view vindicated in one case. 74 In 
general practice, however, it seems that courts have not been so demand­
ing when faced with cases involving derivative claims against 'others'?5 
Finally, we note that, read closely, the part of article 152 that declares 
the 'plaintiff may proceed with the suit if . . .  the company would suffer 
irreparable damage if the suit could not proceed immediately' does not 
appear to mean that demand may be excused {although that may have 
been intended). As worded, the statute requires demand to be made even 
in such urgent situations; what it allows to be waived is the waiting 
period. This strict interpretation does not seem to be how the Chinese 
courts normally understand the provision, however, as they regularly 
permit demand waiver in 'urgent' or 'emergency' circumstances. 
3 Defendants and associated causes of action 
One of the very important - and relatively unusual - aspects of the Chinese 
derivative action is that article 152 divides potential defendants into two 
classes: insiders {directors, senior managers, and supervisors) and 'others' 
(taren), with the cause of action stated differently for each class. This 
additional prong (corporate action against 'others') is aimed at two situa­
tions: (1)  when a third party (but very often a related party) has injured the 
corporation and conflicted corporate directors or the legal representative 
will not pursue remedies against the third party; and {2) when controlling 
shareholders abuse the corporate form to disadvantage or oppress minority 
shareholders in the company as understood under article 20{2) of the 2006 
72 See Omnibus Regulation, art. 45. 
73 See X. Lu, 'Mantan woguo xin "Gongfsi Fa" gudong daibiao susong qianzhi chengxu' 
['Discussion of the precondition procedure for the shareholders' representative lawsuit in 
China's new "Company Law"'] (2007), Caijingjie [Financial World] July: 23 1-2, 232. 
74 See Tonghe Investment 2009 (demand on the board of directors is adequate). 
75 See Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009 (demand is excused because the company is 
already in liquidation) and Beijing Golden Century 2009 (article 152 is invoked with no 
mention whatsoever of the demand requirement). 
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Company Law?6 Thus, as of 2006, China permits derivative actions in the 
limited 'vertical' sense (company versus corporate fiduciaries) and the 
'horizontal' sense (company versus controlling shareholders for oppression 
or breach of controlling shareholders' fiduciary duties) . As noted in the 
introduction to this chapter, given the capital structures and dysfunctions 
resulting from China's corporatization programme, this ability to use the 
derivative lawsuit against controlling shareholders for a remedy against 
oppression makes very good sense. This inclusion of third parties is a 
significant expansion of the scope of possible defendants when compared 
with Taiwan's Company Law77 and the Japanese Company Law?8 It 
remains unclear, however, why the 2006 Company Law drafters did not 
choose a unified cause of action for traditional insiders and for 'others'. 
Pursuant to article 152, insiders may be sued when they have damaged the 
company through breaches of law, administrative regulations, or the com­
pany's articles of association in the course of performing company duties 
('cause 1'); others may be sued when they have damaged the company by 
violating its lawful rights and interests ('cause 2') . If cause 2 reaches acts not 
covered by cause 1, why should insiders be exempt from it? The structure of 
article 152 suggests, however, that they are not intended to be co-extensive. 
There is ample evidence in our sample of the derivative lawsuit being used 
to go against 'others' - both contracting parties with the injured companl9 
76 'Where a company shareholder abuses its shareholder rights and causes losses to the 
company or the other shareholders, it shall be liable for compensation according to law.' 
This is the equivalent ofthe Anglo-American common law actions for breach of (share­
holders') fiduciary duties and 'oppression'. Articles 20( 1 )  & (3) of the 2006 Company 
Law also provide the basis for a traditional veil-piercing claim in which the claimants are 
third-party creditors of the corporation. 
77 Taiwan Company Law, art. 2 14; defendants are limited to 'directors' only. 
78 The scope of defendants is limited to promoters, directors, supervisors, senior manage­
ment, and liquidation committee members; Japanese Company Law, art. 847(1 ) .  
7 9  See China Zhongqi Futures 2004-6; Chongqing Coal Mine 2006; Pinghai Development 
Company Limited v. Shanghai Zhongxing Group Zhencheng Real Estate Company Limited 
re: Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Company Limited, Shanghai no.1 Intermediate People's 
Court (2005), hu yi zhang min wu (shang) chu zi no. 127; on appeal Shanghai Higher People's 
Court (2006), hu gao min si zi no. 55 (available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/ 
displaycontent.asp?Gid=ll7578353) [Shanghai Decheng Real Estate One 2006]; Pinghai 
Development Company Limited v. Shanghai Municipal Pan-Asia Law Firm and Zhongxing 
Group Zhencheng Real Estate Company Limited re: Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Company 
Limited, Shanghai no.1 Intermediate People's Court (2005), hu yi zhang min wu (shang) chu 
zi no. 122; on appeal Shanghai Higher People's Court (2006), hu gao min si zi no. 58 (available 
at http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp?Gid=1 1 754 1209) [Shanghai Decheng 
Real Estate Three 2006]; (U.S.A.) Enbi Group Yuanji Yanghang v. Shanghai Cooperative 
Investment Company Limited and Zhou Zuyuan re: Shanghai Yuanji International Trade 
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and controlling shareholders.80 Some cases - such as Shanghai Yuanji 
International 2006, Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008 and Beijing Puren 
Hospital 2009 - contain mixed claims, with third-party (but often related­
party) or controlling shareholder defendants as well as defendants who are 
traditional fiduciaries. In these cases, Chinese courts seem less sensitive to 
the differences in the required breaches and damages. 
V The reality of derivative actions in the PRC from 1 January 
2006 to date 
Since 1 January 2006, and with the new derivative action mechanism in 
place, Chinese courts at all levels have accepted derivative pleadings and 
rendered judgments on them. 
1 Absence of CLS or publicly listed CLS-related cases 
Derivative suits involving CLSs, listed or unlisted, are striking by their 
virtually complete absence. 81 This is a tragedy of sorts, as the derivative 
Company Limited, Shanghai no. 2 Intermediate People's Court (2006), hu er zhang min wu 
(shang) chu zi no. 2 (available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp? 
Gid= 1 17613479) [Shanghai Yuanji International 2006]; Wu Yongjian v. Xu Wenxing and 
Zhu Yuxiang re: Beijing Puren Hospital Administration Company Limited, Beijing Municipal 
Shunyi District Basic-Level People's Court (2009), shun min chu zi no. 1 065; on appeal Beijing 
no. 2 Intermediate People's Court (2009), er zhang min zhang zi no. 1 18 1 1 (available at http:// 
vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp?Gid=l l7625069) [Beijing Puren Hospital 
2009]; and Tonghe Investment 2009. 
80 See Zhejiang Golden Bridge CLS 2003 (public shareholder suit against a controlling 30 
percent government-backed shareholder); Henan Lianhua MSG 2004 (minority share­
holder suit against controlling shareholder of a publicly listed company); Pinghai 
Development Company Limited v. Shanghai Zhongxing Group Zhencheng Real Estate 
Company Limited re: Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Company Limited, Shanghai Higher 
People's Court (2005), hu gao min si (shang) chu zi no. 1 (available at http://vip. 
chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp?Gid=l l7578346) [Shanghai Decheng Real 
Estate Two 2005] (suit against a 50 per cent Chinese-foreign joint venture partner to 
make it comply with its capitalization obligations); Shanghai Peieryou 2006 (suit by a 49 
per cent shareholder against a 51 per cent corporate shareholder that has deprived the 
company of a corporate opportunity); Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008 (20 per cent 
shareholder-cum-supervisor sues two other shareholders holding 54 per cent of the 
equity in a three-person LLC); and Beijing Puren Hospital 2009 (defendant is a 90 per 
cent shareholder). 
8 1  For the period prior to 1 January 2006 we found only a few cases; see notes 59-61 above 
and accompanying text. After 2006 we found only a few cases involving an unlisted CLS 
or large numbers of shareholders in an LLC; see, for example, Li Xiaozhong and 28 other 
shareholders v. Xiao Wuyong & Zhang Dingzhong re: Nanchuan Municipal Hardware 
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action was written into the 2006 Company Law precisely to give minority 
shareholders in widely held CLSs a way to bring claims against corporate 
fiduciaries, controlling shareholders, and third party obligors seemingly 
immune from performance or enforcement by related-party-dominated 
companies. 
The only example we have found in the post-2006 period of a case 
involving a listed CLS is one that is still sub judice. 82 Plaintiffs are 
attempting to sue derivatively on behalf of Sanlian Shangshe Company, 
Ltd, against the former controlling shareholder of that listed company, 
Sanlian Group. We feel relatively certain that this is the only listed CLS­
related case in the PRC courts as of January 2010, because it is noted as 
such in the 21 January 2010 brief/request (filed by the defendant) for 
transfer of the case away from the Shandong Higher People's Court to 
the Supreme People's Court in Beijing. The request states, ' [T]his case is 
the first shareholders' representative suit [regarding] a listed company in 
China's capital markets[ . ] '83 
Infrastructure Electric Chemical Industry Company Limited, Chongqing Nanchuan City 
Basic-Level People's Court (2006), nanchuan fa min chuzi no. 538 (available at http://vip. 
chinalawinfo.corn!Case/displaycontent.asp ?Gid= 1 17 484117  and www.siaaacom/falvan­
liku/gongsixiangguan/200910/386516_2.html) [Nanchuan Chemical Industry 2006] 
(twenty-eight shareholders); Dong Fengchang v. Fang Yishu re: Shanghai Zhongjian 
Enterprise Company Limited, Shanghai Hongkou District Basic-Level People's Court, no. 
2 Civil Division, case filed 26 September 2008, case opinion not reviewed, but report by 
Judge Luo Jianhao of the Hongkou District Basic-Level People's Court, 26 February 2009 
(available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zmbrn!content/2009-02/26/content_1043325. 
htrn) [Shanghai Zhongjian Enterprise 2008] (forty shareholders); and Zhu Yongjun and 20 
other shareholder plaintiffs v. Liu Huanren, Zhu Yongjun and Ma Zhonghua re: Shizuishan 
Municipal HengJ!Uan Metals Collection Company Limited, Shizuishan Municipal Wukou 
District Basic-Level People's Court (2008), shi da min zhu zi no. 1008; on appeal Ningxia 
Hui Minority Autonomous Region Shizuishan Municipal Intermediate People's Court 
(2009), shi min zhong zi no. 25 (available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycon­
tent.asp?Gid=l l7633588) [Shizuishan Hengyuan 2009] (twenty-one shareholders). Of 
course, these latter cases do not rise to the level of truly public companies owned by 
thousands of shareholders. 
82 See Sanlian Shangshe 2009. This case was accepted by the Shandong Higher People's 
Court on 1 1  December 2009 (after a large minority shareholder and one independent 
director were able to persuade 1 .56 per cent of the listed company's shareholders to join 
the action). 
83 See Zhongguo zhengquan wang [China Securities Net], 'Daiwei susong: xiao gudong zhi 
sanlian jituan an muqian reng zai jinxingzhong' ['Substitute lawsuit: minority share­
holder's case against Sanlian Group presently still proceeding'] (2010), Zhongguo 
zhengquan wang, 15 March (available at www.p5w.net/stock/news/gsxw/201003/ 
t2866796.htm). 
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There are several possible reasons of varying plausibility for this 
absence of CLS-related cases. First, it is possible that CLSs are on the 
whole better managed and do not see the same kind of abuses that give 
rise to the LLC cases. We find this explanation implausible, and not even 
remotely supported by the data issuing forth from the CSRC and its 
enforcement division. Even if it were largely true, it could not account for 
the almost complete absence of CLS-related cases. Second, it is possible 
that the various obstacles to litigation and transaction costs that we have 
described above weigh especially heavily on prospective plaintiffs in 
CLS-related derivative suits. This explanation has much more plausibil­
ity. The formal law is tougher on plaintiffs in CLS-related suits, and the 
practical barriers are also higher, in the sense that the cost-benefit 
analysis for a small shareholder in a CLS is much less likely to be 
favourable than for a large minority shareholder in an LLC or a closely 
held CLS. Nevertheless, this reasoning is also wanting as an explanation 
for the near-total absence of CLS-related suits. Occasionally, surely, 
there could have been holders of large minority stakes in a CLS who 
wished to bring a derivative suit (as there is in the Sanlian Shangshe 2009 
case). A third possible explanation is that for some reason CLS-related 
derivative suits are being settled invisibly to us, in the shadow of the law, 
as it were, either after filing (case filings are not reported nearly so well as 
case judgments) or even without any filing at all. As with the second 
explanation, however, this one does not help us understand why CLS­
related suits should be so utterly absent from our sample. We cannot 
think of any reasons why CLS-related suits should settle disproportion­
ately early, relative to LLC-related suits, unless perhaps the courts have a 
different attitude to them. Moreover, we surmise that settlement is 
probably easier in the close corporation context, in which all the litigants 
have better information, as contrasted with the information deficit tradi­
tionally experienced by small shareholders in widely held companies. 
We are thus led to a fourth explanation: that courts do not accept CLS­
related shareholder litigation, whether on their own initiative or by 
instruction from superior levels of the judicial bureaucracy. One of us 
has noted how the Chinese courts, on their own, will essentially stop 
accepting politically or technically complex cases. 84 We have set forth 
above certain well-known instructions from the Chinese court 
84 See Howson ('Corporate law'), 332-3, 404 (regarding the nationwide refusal to accept or 
adjudicate cases seeking the enforcement of bank non-performing loans transferred to 
asset management companies and then sold (at a discount) to commercial buyers) .  
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bureaucracy inhibiting or forbidding the acceptance or adjudication of 
cases involving large numbers of plaintiffs. One of us has described 
elsewhere specific public instructions delivered to local-level courts 
commanding them not to accept certain kinds of public company cor­
porate law cases (in one case, shareholder actions to invalidate share­
holder meeting resolutions at publicly listed companies) ,85 and an 
internal instruction forbidding the acceptance of all listed CLS-related 
cases.86 We have both speculated elsewhere as to the reasons for this 
rejectionist stance or these prohibitions from on high, and noted above 
the keen hostility to judicial proceedings involving many parties. Suffice 
it to say here that the lack of derivative lawsuits involving CLSs is a 
starkly evident fact. 
2 'Straddling' actions: 2006 Company Law application to pre-
2006 transactions 
As noted above, the First Company Law Regulations issued by the 
Supreme People's Court allowed judges to apply new rights from the 
2006 Company Law in cases involving transactions that had occurred 
before it came into effect. In our sample, when the facts occur before 
2006, there is not one court that rejects the subsequent derivative plead­
ings simply on those grounds. Indeed, most such cases permit the 
derivative suit explicitly 'with reference to' the 2006 statute.87 
85 Howson ('Corporate law'), 406 (allegedly to deter 'vexatious shareholder litigation'). 
86 Howson ('Corporate law'), 405 (disclosed to one of the authors by the president of one of 
Shanghai's busiest and most expert basic-level people's courts) .  
87 See the following cases: fiangyin Municipal Shunxing Chemical Industry Machinery 
Company Limited v. Lin Zhen [Lim Chin]and Lin fingzhi re: fiangyin Xingyi Particle 
Chemical Industry Company Limited, Jiangsu Province Wuxi Muncipality Intermediate 
People's Court (2005), xi min san chu zi no. 0016-2 (available at http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo. 
com/Case/displaycontent.asp?Gid= l l 7531 198) [!iangyin Xinghua 2005]; Zhang 
Xinlong v. Lu Yiming re: Shanghai Shixing Real Estate Development Operations 
Company Limited, Shanghai no. 2 Intermediate People's Court {2005), hu er zhang 
minsan (shang) chuzi no. 403 (available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/Case/display­
content.asp?Gid= l l7613635) [Shanghai Shixing Real Estate 2005] ; Lin Yu v. 
Aeronautical New Concept Science and Technology re: Beijing Aeronautical 
Chengshitong Smart Card Engineering Company Limited, Beijing Municipal Haidian 
District Basic-Level People's Court {2006), hai min chuzi no. 08927 (available at http:// 
vip.chinalawinfo.com/Case/displaycontent.asp?Gid= 1 1 7529283) [Beijing Aeronautical 
2006]; Beijing Taiqun Technology 2006; Chongqing Coal Mine 2006; Lin Xiangyang, 
Lin Luqiang & Lin Xiongjie v. Lin Yijun, Guangzhou Municipal Lan An Glass Company 
Limited & fia Baozhen re: Guangzhou Lan An Glass Company Limited, Guangzhou 
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3 Avoidance of derivative pleadings 
Several cases in our sample show judicial competence, but also an 
excessively technical reading of article 152 that allows the courts 
involved to avoid the bother of implementing the derivative action. 
Judicial practice is certainly not uniform in this regard, as shown by 
the sometimes equally aggressive acceptance of derivative pleadings 
described in the next section. 
For instance, the Shunde Zhaoyu Electronic Hardware 2007 case saw a 
derivative action on a 'straddling' claim permitted by a basic-level court 
overturned by the intermediate-level court on appeal and re-hearing, 
because the initiating shareholder did not make a demand strictly in 
accordance with article 152. The court may have noticed that the com­
plaining shareholder was also the legal representative, and thus had the 
power to act for the company in bringing suit. Nonetheless, we see the 
same denials of derivative lawsuits, even with apparently strong under­
lying claims, because of the failure to 'undertake legally stipulated pro­
cedures' (conforming demand) from courts around the country.88 
Municipal Tianhe District Basic-Level People's Court (2005), tian fa min er zi no. 2493; 
on appeal Guangdong Province Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court (2006), sui 
zhongfa min san zhongzi no. 1 (available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/Case/display­
content.asp?Gid= 1 17524964) [Guangzhou Glass 2006] ; Fujian Yatong New Materials 
Science and Technology Co., Ltd v. Liu Daomin, Huang Shanshan & Shenyang Fugu New 
Materials Pipes Company Limited re: Liaoning Baotong New Materials Science and 
Technology Company Limited, Liaoning Provincial Shenyang Municipal Intermediate 
People's Court (2006), shen zhang min si quan chu zi no. 1 (available at http://vip. 
chinalawinfo.com/Case/displaycontent.asp?Gid= 1 17541366) [Liaoning Baotong 
Materials 2006] ; Nanchuan Chemical Industry 2006; Shanghai Decheng Real Estate 
One 2006; Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Two 2005; Shanghai Decheng Real Estate 
Three 2006; Shanghai Peieryou 2006; Shanghai Yuanji International 2006; Shanghai 
Taiwu Real Estate 2008; Shunde Zhaoyu Electronic Hardware 2007; Jinja Investments 
Pte. Ltd v. Zong Qinghou re: Hangzhou Wahaha Beverages Company Limited, Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps, no. 8 Agricultural Division Intermediate People's 
Court (2007), bing ba min yi chu zi no. 17 [Hangzhou Wahaha 2007] ; Jiang Zhiling and 
Jiang Zhijun v. Shen Lusui re: Beijing Weishite Development Consulting Company 
Limited, Beijing no. 2 Intermediate People's Court (2009), er zhang min chu zi no. 
09350 (available at http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp?Gid=1 1 7  
625007) [Beijing Weishite 2009] ; and Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009. There are 
only two slight deviations from this pattern: see China Zhongqi Futures 2004-6 (May 
2006 affirmation of pre-2006 lower-court judgment, but not referencing 2006 Company 
Law) and Guangzhou Tianhe Sci tech 2003 (November 2006 judgment in case brought in 
2003, but not referencing 2006 Company Law). 
88 See Shizuishan Hengyuan 2009; Kunming Kangpaili Technology 2009; Beijing Glory 
Project 2009; Beijing Weishite 2009; Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008; Shanghai Peieryou 
2006; and Shanghai Tianguang Medical 2009. 
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Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008 demonstrates a very unforgiving reading of 
the demand requirement, rejecting a derivative lawsuit for a failure to 
make a proper demand even though there was no corporate organ or 
actor in existence that could have received the demand. 
We distinguish these highly technical and prohibitive adjudications of 
derivative claims from other cases that deny the derivative lawsuit on better 
grounds. In the Kunming Kangpaili 2009 case, for example, both the 
Kunming Wuhua District Basic-Level People's Court and the Kunming 
Intermediate People's Court block derivative pleadings with strong under­
lying substantive claims against a shareholder/legal representative of an 
LLC because the initiating parties are so-called 'hidden shareholders' (yin­
ming gudong): contributors of capital to the LLC, but not registered as such 
in public documents. Both Kunming courts decline to rule that a private 
document reciting true shareholding interests should trump the publicly 
registered shareholding interests, and find that, even if the initiating plain­
tiffs are deemed 'shareholders' in law, they have not met the demand 
requirements of article 1 52. This outcome seems reasonable, if only to 
make commercial actors in China take public documents more seriously 
and to assert the primacy of filing and procedural requirements under law. 
In the Shanghai Tianguang 2009 case, the Shanghai Higher People's 
Court properly upholds a lower court dismissal of derivative pleadings for 
demand failure (called a 'procedural defect' and a 'failure to exhaust internal 
remedies') but still allows plaintiffs a direct action against co-shareholders 
(in substance, partners). This also seems a justified redirection of derivative 
pleadings on behalf of the company to a more doctrinally appropriate arena. 
4 Autonomy and acceptance 
Although some courts have used technical readings of the law to avoid 
taking derivative suits, others have gone out of their way to welcome them. 
The 'straddling' Beijing Aeronautical 2006 case - responding to a 
shareholder's suit regarding a 35 per cent shareholder-controlled LLC 
that had already entered liquidation - shows a remarkably aggressive use 
of the derivative lawsuit. Unlike Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008, this case 
allows the suit even though there exists no corporate body that can 
receive the demand.89 Moreover, the court allows the derivative action 
to defeat a statute of limitations defence: the alleged defaults occurred 
89 Courts allowed derivative suits in similar circumstances in Koko Shokai Kabushiki Gaisha v. 
Yao Renjun, Shanghai Municipal Fengxian Laofang Products Factory, and Shanghai 
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between 1999 and 2002 and the case was initially accepted in 2004. The 
court held boldly that, because the derivative claim was not even avail­
able until 1 January 2006, the two-year limitation period did not lapse 
until 1 January 2008. 
In Tonghe Investment 2009, the Zhejiang Higher People's Court per­
mitted the derivative lawsuit to go forward notwithstanding a possible 
technical defect in the related demand and refusal: when the defendant 
was an 'other' (i.e., not an insider) demand was made on, and refusal 
issued in writing by, the board of directors, not the supervisory board. As 
we note above, the 2006 Company Law is unclear in such cases as to 
where demand is to be made. A more cautious court might have used the 
failure to make demand on the supervisory board specifically as grounds 
for rejecting the suit. The same tolerant approach to the precise addres­
see of the demand may be seen in Beijing Puren Hospital 2009, a complex 
related-party 'borrowings' case, in which demand served on the legal 
representative of the looted company was deemed sufficient to let the 
action proceed. 
In Henan Golden Mango Property 2009,90 the first- and second­
instance courts allowed a derivative action to proceed even though the 
complaining shareholder had not formally served demand on the com­
pany that it sue a construction contractor. Both courts noted that 
originally the company had sued on the contract, but had later with­
drawn its action. This, said the second-instance court, 'may be seen as a 
refusal to bring the action' (ke shiwei jujue tiqi susong). 
Courts have also liberally used the notion of urgent circumstances 
(article 152 collapses the thirty-day waiting period when 'the company 
would suffer irreparable damage if the suit could not proceed immedi­
ately') effectively to excuse the demand requirement and to bring other­
wise non-conforming actions into court.91 
Fengxian District Nanqiao Township Agricultural Commercial Cooperative, Shanghai no. 1 
Intermediate People's Court (2008), hu yi zhang min wu (shang) chu zi no. 181  (available at 
http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp?Gid= 1 17632788) [Shanghai Ninghui 
2008]; Liaoning Baotong Materials 2006; and Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009. 
90 Lu Tong v. Henan Longxiang Construction Engineering Company Limited re: Henan 
Golden Mango Property Company, Zhengzhou Municipal Guancheng Hui Minority 
District Basic-Level People's Court (2007), guan min er chu zi no. 257; on appeal 
Henan Provincial Zhengzhou Municipal Intermediate People's Court (2009), zheng 
min er zhang zi no. 718 (available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/Case/displaycontent. 
asp?Gid= 1 1 761 1 759) [Henan Golden Mango Property 2009] . 
91 See Qingdao Municipal Chemical Petroleum Supply Company Limited v. Zhang Chun re: 
Weihai Yinghai Zhiye Development Company Limited, Weihai Municipal Intermediate 
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Indeed, in some cases the Chinese courts appear almost excessively lax 
in accepting derivative pleadings with no real requirements or analysis at 
all. In the only domestic corporate litigation arising from the highly 
contentious Danone-Wahaha dispute92 that went to judgment, the 
Hangzhou Wahaha 2007 opinion rendered on 1 1  December 2007, the 
court did not even comment on the derivative nature of the pleadings, 
and yet allowed the case to proceed and made its own determination on 
the merits. 
5 Technical competence 
PRC judicial officials have shown an impressive level of competence in 
understanding and implementing the derivative mechanism.93 
A small number of 'straddling' cases show lower-level courts refusing 
derivative pleadings before 2006 because there was no legal basis; these 
denials were then overturned on appeal. The 'straddling' Chongqing Coal 
Mine 2006 case exemplifies this. Although the first-instance court denied 
the derivative suit for its lack of a legal basis, the second-instance court 
People's Court (2007), wei min er wai chu zi no. 27; on appeal Shandong Provincial 
Higher People's Court (2008), lu min si zhang zi no. 1 03 (available at http://vip. 
chinalawinfo.com/Case/displaycontent.asp?Gid= 1 1 7677965) [ Weihai Yinghai 2008] 
(emergency situation); Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008 (no emergency situation); 
Huangshan Fenghua Real Estate 2009 (company is in liquidation, so lack of demand 
not an issue); Beijing Golden Century 2009 (company is not able to operate when ousted 
director, legal representative and general manager will not give up corporate chops and 
licences, in defiance of unanimous shareholders' resolution); and Beijing Puren Hospital 
2009 (plaintiff shareholder is notified that dominating shareholder and allegedly breach­
ing fiduciary will apply for bankruptcy of the company as a strategic response to the 
fiduciary lawsuit). See also the published views of a Sichuan Province county-level judge 
confirming the availability of a direct action without demand in 'emergency circum­
stances', with H. Peng, 'Konggu gudong sunhai gongsi ji gudong liyi de falii jiuji yu sikao: 
cong yi gudong daibiao susong kan gongsi ji xiao gudong de falii baohu ['Legal analysis 
and remedies regarding controlling shareholder injury to the company and minority 
shareholders: looking at legal protections for company and minority shareholder rights 
from a shareholder representative suit'] (2009), China Court, 9 March, www.chinacourt. 
org/public/ detail. php?id=34 7 591. 
92 The dispute is described by J. Perkowski, 'Danone/Wahaha: the final chapter' (undated), 
Managing the Dragon, http:/ /managingthedragon.com/?p=598; and Forbes, 'Danone 
quits Wahaha venture' (2009), Forbes, 30 September (available at www.forbes.com/ 
feeds/afx/2009/09/30/afx6949755.html). 
93 We do not discuss here the many cases in which the derivative action is implemented 
without issue, such as the Shanghai Zhongjian Enterprise 2008 case, in which a mere 2.86 
per cent shareholder brings a suit on behalf of the company against a negligent or 
disloyal legal representative on a loan, and the legal representative is ordered to 
compensate the company for the loan. 
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reversed the decision because the 2006 Company Law had since come 
into effect. 
The Shanghai Kouweier 2008 case94 sticks closely to the derivative 
action offered in the 2006 Company Law, rejecting a 'double derivative' 
lawsuit. The plaintiff was a shareholder in a company that was the sole 
shareholder of the allegedly damaged entity; the court ruled that he could 
not bring an action on behalf of a remote subsidiary. Regardless of policy, 
this is the technically correct solution under article 1 52, which does not 
seem to allow for the 'double derivative' /'multiple derivative' action.95 
There are also several cases applying the derivative lawsuit mechanism 
of article 152 to foreign-invested enterprise legal persons established 
under and governed by the separate system of FIE laws and regulations.96 
In no case do we find a Chinese court refusing a derivative lawsuit on the 
grounds that the relevant entity is an FIE and therefore not governed by 
the Company Law. 
A number of opinions show real technical competence in denying 
derivative pleadings because the underlying injury is in reality suffered 
by one partner/shareholder, and not the jointly invested LLC. We 
see this in Beijing /indao Hongping Advertising 2008, in which the 
first-instance court (affirmed on appeal) dismisses somewhat spurious 
derivative pleadings in what is really a dispute between fifty-fifty LLC 
shareholders, and the company has already entered into liquidation and 
there is no injury to the corporation. The Beijing Glory Project 2009 case 
takes much the same line in denying derivative pleadings - formally for a 
lack of conforming demand on the company, but in our view really 
because the dispute is between two parties to a real estate development 
contract in which the money-investing partner sues the party holding 
the development licence for defection. In each of these cases, and several 
94 Jiang Wenhong v. Wu Jinhui and Suzhou Jiaci Clothing and Accessories Company 
Limited re: Shanghai Kouweier Clothing and Accessories Company Limited, Shanghai 
no. 2 Intermediate People's Court (2008), hu er zhang min wu (shang) chu zi no. 21  
(available at  http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo.com/Case/displaycontent.asp?Gid= 1 17622632) 
[Shanghai Kouweier 2008] . 
95 Other jurisdictions allow for such actions: Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 
Singapore all allow them by statute, and Hong Kong allows them as a matter of a 
common law extension of existing derivative suit doctrine. 
96 See Beijing Taiqun Technology 2006; Beijing Weishite 2009; Liaoning Baotong Materials 
2006; Shanghai Decheng Real Estate One 2006; Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Two 2005; 
Shanghai Decheng Real Estate Three 2006; Shanghai Yuanji International 2006; 
Hangzhou Wahaha 2007; Shanghai Kouweier 2008; Shanghai Ninghui 2008; and 
Weihai Yinghai 2008. 
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others in our sample,97 the Chinese courts effectively channel what are 
pleaded as corporate and thus derivative lawsuits into the more appro­
priate arena of direct claims between partners. 
6. Difficulties regarding underlying substantive claims 
Our research shows that while Chinese courts may increasingly accept 
derivative pleadings, they can encounter difficulties in adjudicating the 
underlying substantive claims. Indeed, only rarely do we see really robust 
application of the underlying substantive claim against a traditional 
corporate fiduciary. One rare example is the Beijing Xiangkouxiao 
Food and Beverage 2009 case,98 in which a legal representative who had 
misappropriated corporate revenues was found to have violated the 'duty 
to properly use company assets' (zhengdang shiyong gongsi caichan de 
yiwu), which was in turn explicitly deemed a part of the 2006 Company 
Law Article 150 duties.99 
Far more common are case opinions where Chinese judges fumble or 
avoid adjudication of the underlying substantive claims. For example, in 
Nanchuan Chemical Industry 2006, the court allowed a derivative lawsuit 
even though the acts complained of occurred before 2006. But it rejected 
the underlying substantive claim against some of the defendant directors 
and officers of the company, reasoning (bizarrely, in our view) that ' . . .  
even though the other defendants may have been in breach of their duty 
of care, 100 the breach of that duty and resulting liability to the company 
[for damages] is a separate legal relationship (lingwai de falii guanxi).' 
We see a similar misstep on the substantive claim in the Weihai 
Yinghai 2008 case, at least at the first level of adjudication. There, the 
court accepts derivative pleadings, but then finds the defendant's alleged 
misdeeds not actionable either because they are authorized by a corpo­
rate resolution (use of the company chop) or because they 'pertain to 
97 See, for example, Shanghai Tianguang Medical 2009 (Shanghai Higher People's Court 
overturns first-level denial of derivative lawsuit but then directs re-pleading based on 
plaintiffs (not company's) injury). 
98 Wen ]ian guo v. Zhao Limei re: Beijing Xiangkouxiao ]ingnan ]injia Food and Beverage 
Company Limited, Beijing Xuanwu District Basic-Level People's Court (2009), xuan 
min chu zi no. 2625 (available at http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/displaycontent.asp? 
Gid= l l 761 7288) [Beijing Xiangkouxiao Food and Beverage 2009] . 
99 See also Shanghai Kouweier 2008, in which the court dismisses the 'double derivative' 
action but then nonetheless addresses the underlying breach of duty of care. 
100 The opinion uses both 'qinmian yiwu' from the 2006 Company Law and 'zhuyi yiwu' - a 
form used in Chinese-language academic writing and Taiwanese corporate law. 
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issues of the company's internal administration' (shuyu gongsi neibu 
guanli shiyi) (disclosure to company shareholders of financial records). 
The same problem is apparent again in Huangshan Fenghua Real 
Estate 2009. In that case, the Anhui provincial-level court affirms the 
lower court's allowance of the derivative action, but also upholds its 
dismissal of the underlying cause of action because it relates - in the 
words of the defendant's brief - 'merely to internal shareholder disputes' 
(jinjin shi gudong neibu jiufen), and because the underlying contracts 
challenged as harmful to the company are subject only to the principles 
of contract formation described in the PRC Contract Law. The opinion 
goes so far as to say that the derivative action is applicable only to 
asserted breaches of Article 150 of the Company Law by corporate 
directors and senior management. Thus, when faced with nine land 
sales contracts at below-market value entered into by the company 
already in liquidation as represented by the defendant, the court refuses 
to look at potential breaches by the defendant and instead affirms the 
validity of the contracts under the PRC Contract Law. 
We find a number of cases where courts accept the derivative action 
but seem reluctant to find fiduciary duty violations. 101 Shanghai XXX 
Electric 2009102 shows an inability to apply fiduciary duty law coloured 
by misunderstanding of the logic behind the derivative action. The court 
rejects the underlying cause of action on grounds which include the 
failure of the plaintiff to show losses by the company, and then proceeds 
to subvert the rationale behind the already-accepted derivative plead­
ings, noting that 'the lent funds can be recovered via a lawsuit by the 
company and other methods against director Zhang [the defendant] .' 
The court fails to understand that the defendant director, as executive 
101 See, among others, the following cases with alleged duty of loyalty breaches: Shanghai 
Decheng Real Estate One 2006; Zhang Wei v. Wang Long re: Beijing Yuannian Culture 
Development Company Limited, Beijing Municipal Fengtai District Basic-Level People's 
Court (2009),feng min chu zi no. 02775 (available at http:/ /vip.chinalawinfo.com/case/ 
displaycontent.asp?Gid=l l 7616166) [Beijing Yuannian Culture 2009]; Liu Bin v. Li 
Zhanjun re: Beijing Wanpeng Property Management Company Limited, Beijing 
Municipal Haidian District Basic-Level People's Court (2009), hai min chu zi no. 
13158; on appeal Beijing no. 1 Intermediate People's Court (2010), yi zhong min 
zhong zi no. 1099 (available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/Case/displaycontent.asp? 
Gid=l l7661861)  [Beijing Wanpeng Management 2010] ; Shanghai Ninghui 2008; and 
Shanghai Yuanji International 2006. 
102 Lin X v. Zhang Y re: Shanghai XXX Electric Company Limited, Shanghai Minhang 
District Basic-Level People's Court (2009) (available at www.personal.umich.edu/ 
-purzel!national_reports/china/% 20(PRC).pdf)[Shanghai XXX Electric 2009] . 
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director and legal representative of the LLC, can block the company 
entirely from seeking this remedy. 
7 Confusion between derivative and representative lawsuits 
In some cases we see excessively aggressive and technically flawed 
application of the derivative lawsuit, or the use of article 152 
in situations that do not warrant it. One good example of this phenom­
enon is the Beijing Huayuya Real Estate 2009 case, 103 in which the court 
invokes article 152 to force a dissident shareholder to fulfil the terms of a 
shareholders' resolution. In this case, a father shareholder in a three­
shareholder LLC dies, whereupon his 72 per cent interest in the LLC 
passes to his wife and three of his children, and all the shareholders 
resolve to appoint the surviving wife as legal representative and executive 
director of the LLC. The two pre-existing shareholders (the deceased 
father's child and someone who is probably his or her spouse) do not 
implement the shareholders' resolution, and take no action to register 
the surviving wife's appointment as the new legal representative and 
executive director. The new shareholders sue, in their own names and to 
remedy injury to themselves, to cause performance of the shareholders' 
resolution. In allowing the suit to proceed under article 152, the court 
states, 'Shareholders who suffer injury to their rights can bring a share­
holders' representative suit' (quanli shou sun de gudong keyi tiqi gudong 
daibiao susong). This is incorrect as applied to this case. If the court 
really means 'representative suit' then it is wrong, because the plaintiff 
shareholders do not seek to represent any other shareholders. If it means 
'derivative suit' under article 152, it is equally wrong, because the share­
holders are not suing over an injury to the company. 104 
8 Judge-made direct litigation right for supervisors 
Our review of cases shows an interesting example of judicial initiative: 
the judge-made creation of a legal right for supervisors to sue on behalf 
of the injured company without any prodding from a shareholder 
103 Chen X, Zhu X, Zhu 1 and Zhu 2 v. Beijing Municipal Huayuya Real Estate Development 
Company Limited, Zhu 3 and Li X, Beijing Municipal Dongcheng District Basic-Level 
People's Court (2009), dong min chu zi no. 4349 (available at http://vip.chinalawinfo. 
com/case/displaycontent.asp?Gid= l l 76161 17) [Beijing Huayuya Real Estate 2009] . 
104 See the same misconception in Dongfang Construction Group 2009. 
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demand. 105 We speculate that PRC courts have created this direct liti­
gation right in order to avoid technical obstacles to implementation of 
the derivative lawsuit mechanism, while allowing themselves to invoke 
its terms and spirit. Importantly, this direct right of action seems effec­
tive only with respect to closely held LLCs and when the office of super­
visor is coupled with a shareholder interest. 
9 Allocation of court fees and 'loser pays all' 
Court fees in our sample of cases are generally allocated to the loser both 
before and after 1 January 2006. Unfortunately, the case reports we have 
reviewed do not generally reveal how attorneys' fees are allocated 
between the parties, although one imagines that the case opinions 
would describe any variance from the alleged norm in Chinese litiga­
tion - that each party pays its own attorneys' fees. In the derivative action 
context, this would mean that initiating shareholders would have to pay 
their own attorneys' fees. 
In the forty-four cases analysed for this chapter, eighteen adhere to the 
'loser pays all' principle, nineteen are silent on the court fee allocation 
question, and seven show a variation from the alleged 'loser pays' norm. 
Only one case in our sample appears to internalize the logic of the 
derivative action: Beijing Tonghua Online 2009. In this case, shareholder 
plaintiffs bringing suit on behalf of the company are successful in 
derivative pleadings, but unsuccessful on the underlying claim of a 
breach of duty of loyalty, and so the 'third party' (the company that 
has allegedly been injured) is assessed 8, 109 yuan in court fees. 106 
Although the loser still pays, the 'loser' is deemed to be the company, 
105 See Shanghai Shixing Real Estate 2005 (failing to set forth any legal or statutory basis for this 
power, other than to say that the supervisor plaintiff 'has the power according to Company 
Law stipulations' and that such a lawsuit 'conforms to stipulations of law'); Hao Ling v. 
Wang Qiyan re: Beijing Kejiemei Window Company Limited, Beijing Municipal Haidian 
District Basic-Level People's Court (2007), hai min chuzi no. 1 1373; on appeal Beijing no. 1 
Intermediate People's Court (2009), yi zhang zhongzi no. 5142 (available at http://vip. 
chinalawinfo.com/Case/displaycontent.asp?Gid=1 1 7619255) [Beijing Kejiemei Window 
2009] (stating that the plaintiff need not specifically use article 152's derivative action 
mechanism, because he or she is both a shareholder and a supervisory board member); 
Shanghai Taiwu Real Estate 2008 (permitting a 24 per cent shareholder in an LLC to sue 
two co-shareholders holding in the aggregate 54 per cent 'as a supervisor acting for the 
company'); and Beijing Xiangkouxiao Food and Beverage 2009 (seeming to hold that 
supervisors have not only the right but the duty to sue when management is conflicted). 
106 The same logic is vindicated, but in a case that does not adhere to the 'loser pays all' 
principle; see Chongqing Coal Mine 2006, in which the plaintiff shareholders are 
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not the shareholders who initiated the derivative claim on behalf of the 
company. 
There are some cases going the other way. 107 Unfortunately, the case 
reports and opinions do not provide sufficient data for us to know why 
these occasional departures from the 'loser pays all' principle occur. We 
can speculate that departures are more likely to occur when a plaintiff 
has won a significant damage award from defendant(s), as we see in the 
Shanghai Shixing Real Estate 2005 case, in which the defendant was 
ordered to pay 272,000 yuan back to the company. 
VI Critique of article 152 and reform suggestions 
The preceding sections have noted various problems with the article 152 
mechanism. In this section, we summarize our critiques and suggestions 
for reform. 
First, the Company Law should state clearly that the initiating share­
holder of a derivative action must be a shareholder of the affected 
company at the time the suit is brought. 
Second, the Company Law currently lacks any standards for, or even a 
concept of, justified refusal by the board or supervisory board to satisfy 
the demand. Read literally, the statute makes the demand requirement 
virtually meaningless, because if the company does not bring suit upon 
demand the shareholder may always do so. No doubt the drafters were 
concerned about structural bias and demand futility when boards are 
conflicted. Making demand irrelevant, or not allowing a board of super­
visors or directors to make a justified, good-faith, refusal, is no solution, 
however, and may result in abuse of the derivative lawsuit. In addition, 
successful in the derivative action, but the LLC whose interest is being protected is 
assigned almost one-third of the court costs. 
107 These include (in chronological order): Shanghai Shixing Real Estate 2005 (supervisor 
successfully sues on behalf of company but is assessed 96 per cent of court fees); 
Chongqing Coal Mine 2006 (plaintiff shareholders successful in derivative action, but 
the LLC whose interest is being protected is assessed one-third of court fees); Shanghai 
Decheng Real Estate Three 2006 (partially successful plaintiff/appellant and the com­
pany itself pays part of court fees); Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008 (derivative action denied, 
yet court orders return of the plaintiffs litigation fee deposit); Weihai Yinghai 2008 
(successful plaintiff assessed 348,000 yuan in court costs; losing defendant assessed only 
200 yuan); Beijing Kejiemei Window 2009 (initiating supervisor/shareholder permitted 
to sue on behalf of company, but ordered to pay 0.75 per cent of the first-instance 
court's fees and 33.7 per cent of the second-instance court's fees); and Beijing 
Xiangkouxiao Food and Beverage 2009 (initiating supervisor-cum-shareholder pays 
2,389 yuan in court costs; losing defendant assessed only 17 1  yuan). 
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the badly drafted mechanism does not acknowledge the supervisors' and 
directors' duties under article 148 to act in the best interests of the 
corporation, much less any judicial role in evaluating whether their 
refusal of the demand conforms to that duty. The options for statutory 
remediation here are many, including a mandated 'independent com­
mittee' or an affirmative basis for the judicial evaluation of a board 
refusal (or shareholder allegation of demand futility) and recognition 
of something akin to the directors' 'business judgement'. One Supreme 
People's Court judge has made just this suggestion: ' [W] e must stipulate 
effective conditions for any resolution [by the board refusing demand] : 
first, that the resolution is conditioned on prior appropriate investiga­
tion [of the claim] by the supervisory board or the independent directors; 
second, that the directors who vote on the resolution do not include 
defendants in the derivative action; and third, that the resolution be 
made in the best interests of the corporation' ( weile gongsi de zuidade 
liyi). 108 The third prong suggested for justified refusal implies significant 
participation by the judiciary in evaluating whether the refusal is in 
conformity with the directors' fiduciary duties, raising the question of 
whether Chinese judges, who are unlikely to have any significant busi­
ness experience, are up to the task. 
Third, the Company Law should stipulate upon whom demand must 
be made when the action demanded is against a non-insider 'other'. 
Failure to do so risks allowing conservative judicial institutions to stymie 
meritorious derivative lawsuits on a technicality. 
Fourth, the Company Law should clarify the exact effect of 'urgent' or 
'emergency' circumstances upon demand and the stipulated thirty-day 
waiting period. Is, as most PRC courts rule, demand itself excused, or is it 
just the thirty-day period that is eliminated? 
Last in the line of specific critiques, article 152 makes a distinction in 
terms of the wrong on the company that triggers the derivative action: 
insiders may be sued when they have damaged the company through 
breaches of law, administrative regulations or the company's articles of 
association in the course of performing company duties, while 'others' 
may be sued when they have damaged the company by violating its 
lawful rights and interests. We can think of no good reason for this 
difference. 
More generally, we question the idea of minimum shareholding 
requirement for CLSs. This makes little sense in the PRC, where there 
108 Jin ('A study') ,  423. 
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remains such concentrated ownership in publicly listed CLSs, and there 
are so many temptations for controlling shareholder malfeasance or 
minority shareholder oppression. It makes even less sense when there 
are so many other mechanisms working against minority shareholders 
bringing what, after all, is a corporate claim (and must be recognized as 
such during adjudication). There is a persistent (and, we believe, mis­
taken) sense in the Chinese discourse that the required minimum is tied 
to the notion that a derivative lawsuit is in fact a 'representative' lawsuit, 
and therefore requires a minimum number of shareholders to 'represent' 
the interests of all or most of the other shareholders. 109 This is a radical 
misunderstanding of the derivative action: a derivative lawsuit is a 
corporate claim, merely initiated by one or more shareholders to get 
around the structural block presented by those who control the corpo­
ration and are unwilling to bring suit. In addition, even if there is to be a 
minimum threshold, the 1 per cent level may well be so high as to 
discourage otherwise meritorious actions by minority shareholders in 
widely held companies. 1 10 
PRC jurisdictional rules generally require derivative lawsuits to be 
heard where the company has its headquarters (zhuyao banshichu 
jigou ) . m  This hurts derivative actions, because the insiders of the cor­
poratized state-owned enterprises being sued - or the controlling share­
holders of such entities - are often locally powerful government and 
Party figures who have significant political, administrative and fiscal 
control over the local court system. 
With respect to the role of the judiciary in evaluating fact and law 
questions, the language in the statute about 'irreparable damage to the 
interests of the company' (i.e., an emergency) strongly implies some kind 
of real evaluation role for the PRC judiciary, unless shareholders are 
simply to plead these conclusions and have them accepted in all cases. 
We note travesties such as the Beijing Dingyu Cable 2008 case, in 
which derivative pleadings are denied on the theory that there is no 
109 For example, PRC Supreme People's Court Justice Jin Jianfeng justifies minimum 
shareholder percentages because they 'ensure that the plaintiff is sufficiently represen­
tative'; see Jin ('A study') ,  4 18. Of course, in a true derivative action, the plaintiff is the 
company and is not 'represented' by anyone, and certainly not by shareholders (who 
have their own 'direct' claims to pursue) .  
1 10 See Tang ('Protecting minority shareholders'), 145. The fear of abusive strike suits 
brought just for their settlement value may well be overblown; see Zhang ('Making 
shareholder derivative actions'), 549-50. 
1 1 1  See Jin ('A study'), 423. 
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emergency situation because the company has already been fully looted. 
At the same time, though, we also see a good number of other opinions in 
which an emergency is found and demand is effectively waived. 
In addition, the system does not currently take account of demands by 
shareholders who have previously ratified the allegedly offending actions 
under conditions of full disclosure, and who then opportunistically turn 
around and initiate derivative lawsuits protesting those actions. In each 
of these examples, the only body that can properly evaluate the fact and 
law questions is the judiciary. It remains to be seen, however, if Chinese 
courts have the requisite competence and autonomy to make the 
required evaluations in such complex situations. Here they might benefit 
from stronger, more bright-line rules. 
The 2006 Company Law and the current Civil Procedure Law remain 
unclear on the legal position of the company in the newly authorized 
derivative lawsuit. The classic Anglo-American derivative action is in 
fact two suits at equity, one of which is a claim by the company as the 
'real party plaintiff against those alleged to have injured it. This struc­
ture is important, because it directs any compensation or damages to the 
company and not to individual shareholders who may have distinct 
interests in the litigation. Civil law systems handle this somewhat differ­
ently, and, again, in a way that may be tied closely to the understanding 
that derivative lawsuits are really 'representative' lawsuits. The Japanese 
system, for instance, holds that the corporation is not a necessary formal 
party to a derivative lawsuit, and that the court may at its own discretion 
reject the company's application to join or include the corporation in the 
action when the company is unwilling to be joined. The 2006 Company 
Law makes no explicit provision for the formal role of the corporation, 
and thus judges are left to wonder if the company in a well-pleaded 
derivative action is: ( 1 )  not a party; (2) the plaintiff (with, or alone and to 
the exclusion of, the shareholders taking the initiative); or (3) some kind 
of involuntary 'third party' (di san ren) - a role permitted under the 
PRe's Law on Civil Procedure but only on voluntary application. 1 12 One 
influential SPC judge asserted in 2008, for example, that the company 
should be either the 'name plaintiff or the 'third party' (di san ren) . 1 13 
Efforts should therefore be made in statute (either the Company Law or 
the Civil Procedure Law) to clarify the position of the company as the 
1 12 Civil Procedure Law, art. 56(1) .  Supreme People's Court judge Jin Jianfeng acknowl­
edges this technical problem; see Jin ('A study'), 421.  
1 13 See Jin ('A study'), 415. 
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formal plaintiff. This would help derivative lawsuits on a number of 
fronts, from cost allocation (including upfront payment of attorneys' 
fees and court costs by the usually richer company) and financial incen­
tives to the adjudication of harm and causality, and it would go a long 
way to clearing up the evident confusion rooted in the term 'representa­
tive lawsuit', with its implication that the company is being 'represented' 
by the shareholders. The company should be the direct, named, plaintiff, 
and thus the lawsuit should be pursued in the company's interests. 
We are also concerned about the position of shareholders who are not 
part of the demand on the company. If it is a true derivative claim then 
they are affected equally by the success or failure of the company's claim. 
How are such other shareholders to be protected against colluding 
shareholders who get control of the article 152 lawsuit (i.e., those who 
are first to make a demand), however? One idea is to give other non­
demanding shareholders the right to join in control of the suit if it 
proceeds. 1 14 Another idea is to provide a statutory basis for courts to 
prohibit settlements between defendants and the shareholders running 
the derivative lawsuit.1 15 Rules on derivative actions in foreign jurisdic-
. ft . h 1 . h 1 1 16 Ch" ' tlons o en restnct sue sett ements w1t out court approva . ma s 
current civil procedure norms stipulate no such restriction. That is why 
the pre-2006 sub-national 'opinions' permitting derivative lawsuits 
stipulated precisely such a constraint117 and why one authoritative 
Supreme People's Court justice has urged that settlements in derivative 
actions be permitted only with court approval. 1 18 
Finally, given the existing obstacles to the financing of derivative 
actions in China, we believe it would be unwise for China to impose 
1 14 This has been suggested by Supreme People's Court judge Jin Jianfeng, although his 
rationales - first, that this will enable better investigation of defendant malfeasance, 
and, second, that the lawsuit be more 'representative' - miss the key concern, which is 
the prevention of collusion. See Jin ('A study'), 420. 
1 1 5  In the one case in our sample that is settled (while on appeal before the Supreme 
People's Court), the case reports also focus on the caution that must be exercised with 
respect to any settlement reached in a derivative action, given the risk that the 
controlled company will agree to terms that are disadvantageous to it. See Tonghe 
Investment 2009. 
1 1 6 See, for example, FRCP, 23.1 .  The Chinese Law on Civil Procedure provides only 
affirmation of the ability to settle suits, at article 5 1 .  
1 1 7  See, for example, 'Shanghai Opinion': ' [W]hen the parties raise a settlement proposal in 
the course of the litigation, and the People's Court determines that the proposed 
settlement will harm the interests of other shareholders of the company, then the 
settlement should not be approved and the litigation should continue.' 
1 18 See Jin ('A study'), 425. 
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further obstacles, such as requiring that demanding shareholders post a 
bond as a precondition to bringing a derivative suit. 1 19 Indeed, article 47 
of the 2003 Omnibus Regulation reproduced one mechanism familiar 
from article 847(7) of the Japanese Company Law designed to inhibit 
nuisance suits: providing that, if derivative lawsuit defendants can offer 
evidence that plaintiffs were suing in 'bad faith', the court could, upon 
application of the defendants, require plaintiffs to post security for the 
defendants' reasonable litigation expenses. This would be counterpro­
ductive in the PRC, even if included in some misguided attempt to create 
an 'international (best) standard' derivative lawsuit. 
VII Conclusion 
In today's China, the derivative lawsuit is suddenly viable and is increas­
ingly being brought to the courts throughout the country. It is unques­
tionably a step forward in the development of China's corporate 
governance that courts are actually hearing derivative suits despite the 
technical, institutional, economic, and political obstacles we have iden­
tified in this chapter. Given the courts' preference for specific instruc­
tions over general statutory authorizations, this is all the more 
remarkable, because the Supreme People's Court has not yet promul­
gated implementing rules specifically governing the derivative lawsuit. 
Our study of cases shows that the courts will permit derivative plead­
ings to overcome structural obstacles inherent in the corporate form, and 
sometimes quite aggressively, as seen in the derivative actions permitted 
without any statutory basis, the use of the 1994 Supreme People's Court 
Approving Response facially limited to foreign-party-controlled joint 
ventures as a legal basis for other derivative suits, the many straddling 
actions applying the post-2006 derivative action to pre-2006 transac­
tions, the abundant use of the derivative lawsuit 'horizontally' against 
'others' that include controlling shareholders, and the post-2006 allow­
ance for a supervisor's direct right of action to sue on behalf of the 
company (at least when the supervisor is also a shareholder). These 
judgments are strong evidence that the technical defects we have high­
lighted have not seriously constrained the development or implementa­
tion of the derivative action in China, at least with respect to LLCs. In 
119 See the suggestion of Supreme People's Court judge Jin Jianfeng (Jin ('A study') ,  423-4) 
and Tsinghua University law professor Tang Xin's pre-emptive worry on the same 
score (Tang ('Protecting minority shareholders'), 146). 
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addition, the developments and specific jurisprudence discussed in this 
chapter also show the courts' increasing cognizance of, and comfort 
wielding, the complex substantive corporate law doctrines that underpin 
the derivative lawsuit vehicle (including fiduciary duties, at least as far as 
the duty of loyalty is concerned). These observations bode well for the 
elaboration and strengthening of China's corporate governance regime 
and the role of the courts in applying corporate law. 
On the other hand, some of the defects and obstacles we discuss in this 
chapter will provide an easy excuse for courts to avoid hearing derivative 
suits, thereby leaving certain corporate actors and contract parties unac­
countable. Most importantly, we have found almost no cases involving 
listed, or even unlisted, CLSs. We have speculated above on the reasons 
for this absence. Whatever the reasons, it remains true that the virtual 
absence of CLS-related cases is a misfortune for corporate law and 
corporate governance in the PRC. For the rapidly expanding number 
of CLSs and their minority shareholder investors, the derivative suit 
mechanism of article 152 is simply not working, or not being permitted 
to work. 
A further problem we observe is that, even when the derivative action 
is successfully implemented, some courts remain wary or uncompre­
hending of the underlying corporate law doctrines, especially the duty of 
care. We found virtually no cases involving the duty of care, and other 
research we have done in non-derivative suit cases yields similar results. 
Indeed, we found one shocking case, noted above, that liberally permit­
ted a derivative action but then abandoned application of the substantive 
fiduciary claim because the latter was deemed part of a 'separate legal 
relationship'. If courts are unwilling or unable to enforce a duty of care, 
an important element of the rationale behind allowing derivative suits 
will remain unrealized. 
In sum, China's mechanism for derivative lawsuits remains insuffi­
cient to support good corporate governance and accountability for 
managers and controlling shareholders in widely held CLSs. It is not 
wholly insufficient, or so weak, that we would advise abandoning the 
effort to improve the associated substantive law and to develop the 
institutions needed to apply it. Indeed, the mechanism's mere existence 
is in some sense helping judicial institutions act more autonomously and 
with greater power in Chinese society. On the corporate governance side, 
and particularly in the absence of other remedies for shareholder oppres­
sion, it is a vital tool for shareholders in CLSs and LLCs alike. We believe 
that the derivative lawsuit has a future in China. We also believe, 
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however, that at present it can only supplement, and not replace, state 
regulatory institutions in the policing of corporate governance and 
insider action. In China today it remains state regulatory institutions, 
and not courts, that are likely to have the necessary independence from 
local political and economic interests, as well as the technical expertise, 
to enforce accountability and expanded legal rights. 
